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This rhetorical project analyzes the historical and contemporary prevalence of some of 
the popular metaphors that have come to characterize recipients of government assistance 
programs such as food stamps, also known as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program. By synthesizing the metaphor theory of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson with 
the sociological concepts of doxa, habitus, and heretical discourse posited by Pierre 
Bourdieu, this project not only spotlights these negative metaphors but also offers ways 
of disrupting their tacit influence over people’s perceptions, which otherwise are in 
danger of reproducing themselves. The metaphors discussed seek to reduce the poor on 
government assistance to the level of parasites, animals, and sinner criminals. In the 
American political landscape of the latter half of the twentieth century and into the early 
twenty-first century, these rhetorical attacks have become more frequent, and a good 
reason for this increase in frequency has to do with an anthropological theoretical 
framework known as the “culture of poverty,” which many agree was an institutionalized 
effort to blame the victims of poverty for their own oppression. However, despite the 
overall failure of the War on Poverty to lift all Americans into prosperity, some of the 
ideas that flourished during the late 1960s were acts of heretical discourse and can be 
adapted to help those on government assistance today challenge the assumptions that the 
wider society holds regarding the poor. Heretical discourse can be an effective way of 
enhancing democratic engagement in a given population, with the ultimate aim of 
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 Language is a powerful tool that human beings use to define their various 
realities. This is because a person’s language choices can reinforce his or her 
assumptions, which structure the way reality is perceived, and this can be a force either 
for good or for ill, though the understanding of “good” and “ill” can of course vary based 
on the individual or community in question. In the United States, a troubling belief held 
by certain public officials, and presumably by extension their constituents, is that those 
who are defined by the precariousness of their socioeconomic situations (and therefore 
need to access government assistance to get by) exhibit characteristics that are somehow 
different from those who are perceived to conform to a society’s norms—for instance, the 
American middle class. Whether intentionally or not, these beliefs lead to the implicit 
assumption that the person who is deficient in one characteristic or another (in this case, 
good financial footing) is thus less than human. The value of the human being in a 
capitalistic society, in other words, is largely based on his or her net worth. An analysis 
of the language practices that control how people perceive one another and the world 
around them will show the prevalence and seeming “naturalness” of a belief system that 
holds that certain groups are subhuman. However, the very qualities that are perceived to 
define these groups are socially constructed. For instance, as a group, the poor1 are 
                                                 
1 This project will refer to two generalized populations, “the middle class” (or “middle earners”) and “the 
poor.” Because these simplified terms will be used throughout this project and for the sake of brevity, an 
effort will be made here to define them. The middle class, in this analysis, should refer to a household of 
any size and in any given community that makes a living wage but still has at least one household member 
working. According to an MIT project entitled The Living Wage Calculator, a living wage in Knox County, 
Tennessee, in 2015 and 2016, is considered $9.60 an hour for a household composed of one adult only; 
adding a child to that household increases that figure to $20.16, and for two children, it increases to $23.31. 
For a household with two adults in which only one is working, the figure is $16.70, and $20.22 when a 
child is added to the home or $22.53 for two children. The term “poor” is an even more general term, but 
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sometimes described with adjectives such as “lazy,” “parasitic,” and “animalistic.” In 
recent years, politicians on the national stage such as Mitt Romney and Paul Ryan, as 
well as state and local public figures, have used language classifying the poor in these 
ways; such rhetoric is not reserved for conservatives, however, as even liberal politicians, 
who purport to help those who are struggling, have dehumanized the poor with their 
language choices.2 Their powerful modifiers strip already disadvantaged human beings of 
their humanity, even to the point that the poor begin to question their own self-worth. 
Keeping in mind concepts such as “value” and “worth” will be essential to this discussion 
that grapples with the ways people define the humanity of the impoverished, especially 
because one may wonder what the value is in supporting government programs that help 
the poor, if the poor are seen as worthless. This discussion of the worth of the poor 
person (especially the poor person on government assistance) plays itself out over and 
over again from the campaign trail to the checkout line at the grocery store, as will be 
shown.  
Purpose  
 Though not always a popular solution, one way of confronting systemic poverty is 
through government assistance programs. Critical theorist Peter McLaren makes a 
stirring argument when he reflects on why Americans fail to question their ambivalent, 
                                                 
here it will be used to mean any community member or household who, working or not, meets the technical 
and income eligibility requirements for the government’s Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program 
(SNAP), formerly known as food stamps. For a household of one to qualify for SNAP, the gross monthly 
income for a recipient must be at or below $1,276; for a household of two, the figure is $1,726; for three, 
$2,177; this pattern can be continued with a reasonable expectation of accuracy by adding either $450 or 
$451 for each new family member added (USDA, “Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP): 
Eligibility”).  
2 Most of chapter two analyzes some of the conservative rhetoric that has, in recent years, dehumanized the 
poor. Chapter three, on the other hand, is more focused on examples of how liberal rhetoric from the 1960s 
failed to grasp the plight of the poor, reproducing and even institutionalizing stereotypes that questioned the 
humanity of the impoverished, which rendered some antipoverty initiatives ineffective.  
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and sometimes even antagonistic, attitudes toward the poor, especially as these attitudes 
pertain to poor people’s receipt of so-called entitlements: “They [Americans] rarely view 
their country as lagging behind other industrialized economies in the world in providing 
security for its citizens in such areas as health care, family allowance, and housing 
subsidy programs” (68). One may argue that America, “the wealthiest country in the 
world,” as McLaren correctly notes, is not very generous (at least from the standpoint of 
governmental assistance) toward its citizens struggling with financial insecurity because 
of the way the more affluent citizens have been trained, and have trained themselves, to 
define the poor (68). From the standpoint of someone who has never lived through 
financial instability, to be poor is to embody a variety of negative metaphors, some of 
which were listed above; to be poor is to have a literal lack of one or more essential 
qualities that make a person fully human. These ungenerous stereotypes have their basis 
in metaphor, which is much more intimately tied up in the creation and comprehension of 
language than perhaps most people realize. If the more affluent in society have trained 
themselves to view the poor with less-than-generous metaphors that reinforce harsh 
stereotypes, then what remains to be seen is how they (the more affluent) have accepted 
these metaphors and pass them onto the poor, who then continue to accept their own 
socioeconomic oppression. That self-oppression—and how to overcome it—is the topic 
of this project.  
 Some may wonder why a discussion of the linguistic treatment of the poor is 
relevant in a nation that is largely middle class. The fact is, there are some worrying signs 
in the world at large and in America specifically. Commentators and experts in a variety 
of fields have observed that the American middle class is eroding. This is despite the 
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United States’ persistent tendency to define itself as the greatest nation in the world, 
based on the success of its economy, which is of course driven by the strongest economic 
engine the world has ever seen (capitalism). A popular narrative has emerged of late; 
many say that superrich CEOs (what Thomas Piketty has called “super managers”) are 
taking more than their fair share, leaving very little for the rest of society—again, what 
some see is the diminishing of the middle class. A recent story in NPR reported that the 
middle class no longer constitutes half of all Americans; now the poor and the rich 
combined make up a majority of all American citizens (Geewax). Some say the reality is 
much grimmer than just a handful of rich people stockpiling wealth while the rest learned 
to subsist on less. On another recent NPR daytime talk show entitled On Point, economist 
Robert Gordon asserted that the American century (roughly 1870 to 1970) is long over, 
thanks in large part to the ending of the innovation boom that defined that era; even 
though there is a stubborn expectation that wages (and thus quality of life) will continue 
to double roughly every thirty to thirty-five years, the available data from the last forty 
years do not support this optimistic assessment (“Is American Growth Over?”).  
 Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Thomas Piketty’s famous book on the 
cancerous growth of income inequality in the developed world, likewise makes 
arguments along the same lines: in the coming decades, he says, inequality will exceed 
that which was seen during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These were 
the days of the Gilded Age in America, of the Victorian Age in Britain, and La Belle 
Époque in France. This was the Western experiment (in America and elsewhere) known 
as Social Darwinism when the boot heel of capitalism stomped the lower class even 
lower so that the wealthy few could reach an even higher economic echelon (263 – 4). 
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And so, inequality caused by greed and a flagging economy is obviously a popular topic 
of discussion as the U.S. progresses (or perhaps, to keep the tax metaphor alive, 
regresses) through the early twenty-first century.  
Organization  
 In chapter one, this project will introduce the theoretical framework that has 
guided it. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s metaphor theory will be detailed as a way 
of understanding how language reinforces the metaphors that construct people’s 
perceived realities. Pierre Bourdieu’s theories of doxa and habitus will enhance this 
discussion by showing that these metaphors, which people use to comprehend the reality 
around them, are at once unconscious and self-reproducing, and are therefore difficult to 
recognize and overcome. With Bourdieu’s theory of heretical discourse, however, there is 
hope that these metaphors can be identified and questioned so that a more fully developed 
conception of reality might be crafted. Chapter two will look into the historical archives 
of popular media, such as daily newspapers from recent decades, to collect the nation’s 
perspectives on poverty programs and the people who access them. This chapter will 
analyze recent political discourse that is fed by ungenerous metaphors, which seek to 
depict the poor who are on government assistance as somehow less than human. Chapter 
three will look at the history and current legacy of the “culture of poverty” theory, which 
helped policymakers develop the federal initiatives that became the War on Poverty; the 
most detrimental characteristic of the culture of poverty theory was that its conceptions of 
the poor tended to be formed from underdeveloped stereotypes, which undermined the 
efforts of antipoverty workers in the United States’ so-called problem areas, Appalachia 
among them, which will be the subject of this chapter’s case study. The significance of 
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this chapter is to show that if one hopes to alleviate poverty in a given region, then he or 
she must not expect only the poor to change; the social structures that keep people poor 
must also be critiqued, language among them, including the underdeveloped stereotypes 
that are buttressed by anti-poor metaphors. Finally, chapter four will delve deeper into 
how language can perpetuate poverty—as well as challenge those perceptions. This 
chapter will explore various methods for questioning stereotypes, including the study of 
satire and fiction. An open-ended question that this chapter hopes to ask, though not 
necessarily answer, is: How can those on governmental assistance put into practice 
Bourdieu’s theory of heretical discourse, thus helping both the oppressed and their 
oppressors break the cycle of language-reinforced poverty? To further that discussion, 
this final chapter will be a case study of an Appalachian organization called the 
Highlander Research and Education Center that has, since its founding, practiced the very 
form of heretical discourse that Bourdieu calls for, helping people from different 
socioeconomic strata come together to resolve some of society’s most stubborn systemic 
problems, including by questioning the stereotypes that have come to characterize certain 




CHAPTER I: METHODOLOGY  
An Introduction to Metaphor Theory  
 Metaphor theory is based in part on the premise that our neurological states define 
and “create” our worlds. In George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s words, “Our concepts 
structure what we perceive, how we get around in the world, and how we relate to other 
people. Our conceptual system thus plays a central role in defining our everyday 
realities” (3). These conceptual systems, they assert, are undergirded by the metaphors 
that we use to comprehend the world. Metaphor theory is important because it allows the 
critical thinker the opportunity to consciously look at how language shapes conceptual 
systems, which is not something that happens regularly. Indeed, Lakoff and Johnson 
argue that people understand the world by unconsciously accepting the metaphorical 
concepts that they use to construct reality: “[O]ur conceptual system is not something we 
are normally aware of. In most of the little things we do every day, we simply think and 
act more or less automatically along certain lines” (3). Studying metaphors, therefore, 
provides a glimpse into a conception of reality that a person tacitly accepts as true. 
Ultimately, understanding why one thinks one way versus another can be integral for 
understanding why social justice initiatives and governmental assistance programs are or 
are not supported by a majority of citizens. If, for instance, the beneficiaries of these 
initiatives and programs are linguistically perceived to be less than human, then perhaps 
they should not be entitled to them.  
 Lakoff and Johnson begin Metaphors We Live By by analyzing the everyday 
metaphorical concept “ARGUMENT IS WAR.” They point out that another culture, one that 
does not insist on viewing argument as a combative endeavor, might understand debate 
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differently than those that use that metaphor. They contend that if instead of hitting one’s 
mark and destroying one’s opponent’s defenses, a person viewed the act of discourse 
more as a dance, he or she would not even be able to recognize this act as argument. It 
would be something altogether different. This example is given because it demonstrates 
just how slippery language can be, especially metaphors: “The essence of metaphor,” say 
Lakoff and Johnson, “is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of 
another” (5, italics in the original).  
 Another metaphor, central to this project, is that TIME IS MONEY: “You’re wasting 
my time” and “You need to budget your time” are just two examples given in Lakoff and 
Johnson’s analysis. The theorists explain,  
Because of the way that the concept of work has developed in modern Western 
culture, where money is typically associated with the time it takes and time is 
precisely quantified, it has become customary to pay people by the hour, week, or 
year. […] These practices are relatively new in the history of the human race, and 
by no means do they exist in all cultures. They have arisen in modern 
industrialized societies and structure our basic everyday activities in a very 
profound way. […] TIME IS MONEY, TIME IS A LIMITED RESOURCE, and TIME IS A 
VALUABLE COMMODITY are all metaphorical concepts. They are metaphorical 
since we are using our everyday experiences with money, limited resources, and 
valuable commodities to conceptualize time. […] There are cultures where time is 
none of these things (7 – 9).  
These observations are especially relevant to this project because they provide a better 
understanding of how metaphors shape biases regarding the poor, especially biases based 
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on underdeveloped perceptions. Language has the potential to shape these 
underdeveloped perceptions because metaphors, which people use to understand reality, 
do not always help them grasp the full scope of a situation. In explaining how metaphor 
can hide certain aspects of a concept, Lakoff and Johnson say, “It is important to see that 
the metaphorical structuring involved here is partial, not total. If it were total, one 
concept would actually be the other, not merely be understood in terms of it. […] So 
when we say that a concept is structured by a metaphor, we mean that it is partially 
structured and that it can be extended in some ways but not others” (12 – 3). Again, this 
can be applied in terms of a socioeconomic analysis. The poor are not just lazy, in other 
words. They are also sinners because their receipt of government assistance is an act of 
stealing time from the people who go to work every day and are able to make a decent 
wage. They are sinners, and the proof of their sin is that they have failed to make the 
system, one that values time and productivity above all, work for them. In other words, 
their much-deserved punishment (poverty) is further proof of their sinfulness. The poor 
are animals or others because that very system of time and productivity has become 
foreign to them, as it is to lesser creatures or to people from a different time and distant 
place who do not even possess the ability to comprehend this society’s language and 
norms. When one takes Lakoff and Johnson’s theories on linguistics into account, in 
some ways, a metaphor is like painting a picture: a person chooses not only which colors 
to use, but also which scene to depict as well as which angle to view that scene from.  
 Offering a strong theoretical framework with which to dissect public discourse, 
metaphor theory’s greatest strength is that it helps demonstrate how easy it is to get stuck 
in a sort of feedback loop in which perceptions are self-perpetuating. Metaphor theory 
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can thus provide some insight into how anti-poor perceptions are developed. The theory 
delves deeply into the choices of language and might encourage questions such as, “What 
assumptions have led society to support this particular linguistic construct?” and “How 
can language be used to deconstruct this linguistic construct?” In this way, metaphor 
theory is central to critical thinking, but it does not always offer alternative modes of 
thought. It does not, in other words, insist that people question how the use of language 
perpetuates particular perceptions and systems of oppression.  
 For that reason, this project also introduces another theoretical construct to 
suggest that there are, indeed, different ways of seeing the world—and the poor—than 
those with which people have conditioned themselves. In an effort to better understand 
how people can use language to structure and reinforce their own oppression or the 
oppression of those in a community who are perceived to be “other,” this project will 
analyze some of the key terms defined by the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu in two of his 
most important works, The Logic of Practice and Language and Symbolic Power. These 
terms are doxa, habitus, and heretical discourse. Bourdieu’s theories offer a more detailed 
account of the effects of language’s choices in the construction of reality, and these 
additional theories can therefore be windows into new modes of thought.  
Doxa and Habitus  
 In The Logic of Practice, Bourdieu discusses the creation and perpetuation of the 
power relationships between society’s dominated and dominators. How, in other words, 
do some people come to be dominated? How do other people come to dominate? And 
what roles, Bourdieu asks, do language and daily habit play in this process? One of the 
most interesting observations of his analysis is how difficult many daily habits, in any 
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given population, are to break. As mentioned above, they become unconsciously 
embodied in the way one acts or speaks. He says,  
The conditionings associated with a particular class of conditions of existence 
produce habitus, systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured 
structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles 
which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively 
adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an 
express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them. Objectively 
‘regulated’ and ‘regular’ without being in any way the product of obedience to 
rules, they can be collectively orchestrated without being the product of the 
organizing action of a conductor (53).  
The argument here is that one’s habits almost have a mind of their own, and Lakoff and 
Johnson echo this (as noted above) when they say that one’s conceptual systems are 
usually created unconsciously. According to Bourdieu, the repetition of daily tasks is, in 
effect, the result of one’s beliefs, or doxa, which are also strengthened by the repetition of 
those same daily tasks. This is important because the habitus makes achieving a critical 
perspective on mainstream perceptions difficult, though not impossible. Indeed, 
Bourdieu’s theories enable this critical perspective. He continues,  
Practical belief is not a ‘state of mind’, still less a kind of arbitrary adherence to a 
set of instituted dogmas and doctrines (‘beliefs’), but rather a state of the body. 
Doxa is the relationship of immediate adherence that is established in practice 
between a habitus and the field to which it is attuned, the pre-verbal taking-for-
granted of the world that flows from practical sense (68).  
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In other words, the beliefs that people hold are so deeply engrained in their bodies that 
they have formed these regular habits that are difficult, even seemingly impossible, to 
break. People reinforce their beliefs regarding the world around them by enacting those 
beliefs. “The habitus,” he says, “is a metaphor of the world of objects, which is itself an 
endless circle of metaphors that mirror each other ad infinitum” (77). Because one’s 
unconscious belief system reproduces habits that confirm those very beliefs, untangling 
language from habit becomes a frustrating endeavor. As Bourdieu puts it, “It is because 
agents never know what they are doing that what they do has more sense than they know” 
(69).  
 Bourdieu further explains how people use their bodies to reinforce their own 
habits. These habits, he says, have their “primary experiences of the body which, as is 
clearly seen in emotion, takes metaphors seriously. For example, the opposition between 
the straight and the bent […] is central to most of the marks of respect or contempt that 
politeness uses in many societies to symbolize relations of domination” (71 – 2). To be 
straight or to be bent, in other words, literally (and certainly metaphorically) means to be 
good or to be bad, respectively. These socially and physically enacted metaphors, as 
Bourdieu points out, are typically stratified along gender lines, but they can certainly also 
be applied in terms of wealth to suggest (for instance) that economically advantaged 
people have found the straight path whereas the poor have wandered off the path entirely.  
 Bourdieu says people inscribe certain values to the ways others hold themselves, 
and to the ways they behave. Again, this is especially evident in sexual relations—“with 
the opposition between big and small to assign to women the tasks that are low and 
inferior, demanding submissiveness and suppleness, and minute, but also petty […]”—
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but it can also be applied to a nearly universal degree (71). Dissecting these stereotypes to 
analyze how they have been formed can be an effort applied to questions of wealth and 
poverty. After all, negative stereotypes seeking to blame the victim are, by their nature, 
engrained in the victim’s perceptions of himself and then become self-perpetuating. 
These perceptions are also held by the dominant members of society—for instance, those 
in society who are more affluent—and so they get passed down and perpetuated by a 
system that affirms and then reaffirms them. The poor live in the poor parts of town, for 
instance, because that is where the poor live. Or the poor abuse drugs and alcohol 
because these are the habits usually reserved for the poor. Or the poor do not have good-
paying jobs because these jobs are held for the people who are meant to have them. 
Challenging these perceptions can have material consequences, such as increased funding 
for housing, rehab, and job training. But first, the metaphors that undergird these 
perceptions must be confronted.  
  Confronting these metaphors, however, is difficult because, as stated above, they 
are so logical that they tend to perpetuate themselves. Bourdieu says,  
It can be seen, incidentally, how such a logic tends to produce its own 
confirmation, by inducing a ‘vocation’ for the tasks to which one is assigned, an 
amor fati which reinforces belief in the prevailing system of classification by 
making it appear to be grounded in reality—which it actually is, since it helps 
produce that reality and since incorporated social relations present themselves 
with every appearance of nature—and not only in the eyes of those whose 
interests are served by the prevailing system of classification (71).  
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Again, what he means here is that one’s very actions tend to reinforce his beliefs, and 
thus habits (some of which are highly detrimental to one’s success in society, or the 
success of others) are reproduced again and again. Even people who are harming 
themselves with their own habits tend to perpetuate those habits. Importantly, this is how 
the oppressed people in a society can believe the unbelievable: they deserve their 
oppression.  
 In The Logic of Practice, Bourdieu speaks of the literally embodied metaphors in 
the physical actions of those he observed during his sociological studies in French-
colonized Northern Africa. His analysis can be adapted to this project’s study of the poor 
in America and how these enacted metaphors become not only learned, but also (and 
more importantly) habit. This project argues that viewing poverty as the result of a moral 
or intellectual deficit is itself a habit, and examples of this habit will be shown below. It 
is hard to deny the way that the habitus controls people’s actions in these ways. Habitus 
keeps alive various cycles of oppression, including the acceptance of poverty. Bourdieu’s 
theories can shed light on how the cultural beliefs and social assumptions (doxa) of 
middle income America become physically incorporated, from a very early age, into the 
daily lives both of those who are oppressed and those who oppress. The belief that a 
person using food stamps should not have nice possessions is one that some people hold 
implicitly, and they physically enact this belief with a scoff or a roll of the eyes when 
they see their fellow shoppers are nicely dressed and are nevertheless paying for their 
groceries with EBT cards. The idea that parents receiving cash assistance and 
government healthcare are moochers is another belief that causes people to look down on 
the poor and speak of them in disparaging terms, giving voice to the metaphors (parasite, 
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sinner) that support their deeply held beliefs. These beliefs and assumptions are therefore 
cemented in the repetitive habits that carry people through the day, which can lead them 
quite easily into feeding their own oppression or, on the other hand, to not questioning 
how they oppress others. As Bourdieu notes and as the word habitus suggests, a person 
does this and rarely realizes it.  
 These beliefs should be challenged because robust dissent practiced by the 
oppressed is a necessary attribute in a healthy democracy, and Bourdieu’s ideas help 
explain why. If Bourdieu is right and the habits of a person’s body are bound up 
inseparably with the act of language and the phenomenon of time, then every action one 
takes leads him further down the same road he has always been on. In other words, 
nothing changes as people go about their daily lives—at least not until they make 
conscious efforts to change how their lives are structured. People tend to practice their 
own oppression and the oppression of others, says Bourdieu, calling this act “the process 
of acquisition—a practical mimesis (or mimeticism)” (73). Because one tends to copy the 
actions of others, if the actions of others happen to be oppressing, then the observer 
naturally solidifies his or her own oppression or the oppression of others, be it 
socioeconomic, race-based, etc. “The body,” Bourdieu says, “believes in what it plays at: 
it weeps if it mimes grief” (73). This disarmingly simple observation, when considered a 
little more closely with the rest of his arguments, helps explain why the linguistic 
phenomenon of unconscious bodily reproduction (belief-fueled habit) makes the act of 




 But here this project must be careful, as one does not wish to stray too close to a 
theory that blames the victim. Such a theory might insist that the poor are poor because 
they have forgotten how to hold themselves up or how to fight back or how to act 
normatively in a largely middle class society. Instead of blaming the victim, one should 
consider how Bourdieu’s theories help with the goal of critically analyzing the metaphors 
that reinforce acts of oppression. An understanding of the theoretical concepts of doxa 
and habitus will allow the middle class (which should be defined as those who earn a 
living wage yet still need to work) to perceive the poor differently by helping them 
recognize how their current anti-poor perceptions have come from deeply engrained 
metaphors that they both unconsciously accept as true. If members of the middle class 
look at their perspectives of poverty as self-reflexively as possible, then the causes of 
poverty do not seem to be one-sided at all. Instead of the poor being responsible for their 
own poverty, society itself is due a large share of the blame.  
Heretical Discourse  
 Because doxa (beliefs) and habitus (habits that reinforce those beliefs) are so 
tacit, Bourdieu developed another way of explaining how linguistic dissent can occur 
given the conceptual and material forces that militate against it. He called this theoretical 
concept heretical discourse. Someone who wishes to enact heretical discourse, such as by 
questioning the metaphors that have come to tacitly define the poor, must first recognize 
that assumptions reproduce themselves through language and are widely accepted as true. 
They become, therefore, “authorized.” “Indeed,” Bourdieu says in Language and 
Symbolic Power, “since every language that makes itself heard by an entire group is an 
authorized language, invested with the authority of this group, it authorizes what it 
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designates at the same time as it expresses it, drawing its legitimacy from the group over 
which it exercises its authority and which it helps to produce as such by offering it a 
unitary expression of its experiences” (129). Heretical discourse, therefore, is the act of 
speaking up with the aim of challenging society’s tacit assumptions of the oppressed. The 
alternative to heretical discourse is not only an acceptance of these tacit assumptions, but 
also silent approval. Bourdieu specializes in studying the cost of silence. He says,  
Every time they enter into an exchange with the holders of the legitimate 
competence, and especially when they find themselves in a formal situation, 
dominated individuals are condemned to a practical, corporeal recognition of the 
laws of price formation which are the least favorable to their linguistic 
productions and which condemns them to a more or less desperate attempt to be 
correct, or to silence (97).  
In other words, it is difficult for the oppressed to practice acts of heretical discourse 
because “the holders of legitimate competence,” or those who accept and use a society’s 
authorized language, assume that the oppressed have little of value to talk about. 
Heretical discourse, therefore, makes a fuller realization of the humanity of the oppressed 
possible by showing the dominant in society that the dominated also have legitimate 
perspectives to contribute.  
 The analysis of anti-poor metaphors shows how important heretical discourse is in 
breaking the tacit relationship between language and reality. Heretical discourse is 
important, in other words, because it allows for the recognition that society’s oppressive 
systems are impermanent and contingent on language. Bourdieu explains: “We know that 
the social order owes some measure of its permanence to the fact that it imposes schemes 
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of classification which, being adjusted to objective classifications, produce a form of 
recognition of this order, the kind implied by the misrecognition of the arbitrariness of its 
foundations” (127). In other words, that ancient form of oppression known as poverty is 
not only impermanent, but is also based on arbitrary language choices. Among those 
language choices are the metaphors society uses to understand the world it has created 
and the oppression of certain members of society. Negative language choices, such as 
underdeveloped stereotypes, confirm the truthfulness of the metaphors that define the 
poor, labeling them as lazy, undeserving, or broken. These are the assumptions that, 
while beginning in the minds of the more affluent in society, also become structured in 
the minds of the poor. They now view themselves in the same way that the more affluent 
view them. That is the danger of language and why revolutionary language choices can 
help shift perspectives. If language choices help to cement perceptions of the poor, then 
changing those perceptions can also begin through language.  
Synthesizing Metaphor Theory and Bourdieu’s Concepts  
 Metaphor theory and Bourdieu’s theories are, in many ways, quite similar. They 
agree that reality is unconsciously defined by the language choices that people use. 
Bourdieu explicitly argues that analyzing metaphors is a way to recognize how society 
views the oppressed and to bring awareness to the fact that social systems of oppression 
are not permanent. The theories of Lakoff, Johnson, and Bourdieu allow for a similar 
argument: that language choices can further one’s oppression unless a critical analysis of 
those language choices occurs. Metaphor theory does not state this explicitly in 
Metaphors We Live By, but the implication is still clear: without critically analyzing 
language choices, these choices remain largely unconscious. The connections between 
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metaphor theory and Bourdieu’s theories of doxa and habitus are also clear: with these 
theories, a person’s value can be concealed by the words used to describe him (“The poor 
are broken;” “the poor are lazy”), and once the negative perceptions of the poor become 
permanent (or tacit, as Bourdieu would say), history will continue to replicate these 
perceptions ad infinitum. This is precisely how habitus works. However, Bourdieu does 
have hope that the cycle of habitus can be broken through language choices. In Language 
and Symbolic Power, he says,  
Heretical discourse must not only help to sever the adherence to the world of 
common sense by publicly proclaiming a break with the ordinary order, it must 
also produce a new common sense and integrate within it the previously tacit or 
repressed practices and experiences of an entire group, investing them with the 
legitimacy conferred by public expression and collective recognition (129).  
Here again, Bourdieu’s theories resonate with metaphor theory. Here Bourdieu’s theories, 
and metaphor theory as well, allow for an observation of the belief that the poor are 
somehow less than human—maybe they are animals; maybe they are parasites; maybe 
they are thieving sinners; etc. These metaphors become silently accepted by the middle 
class and, likely, by the poor themselves. Bourdieu’s theories suggest that heretical 
discourse can break these silently accepted perceptions and forge new, more positive 
ideas regarding the dominated. In a way, studying how metaphors dehumanize the poor is 
itself a form of heretical discourse. If nothing else, studying the metaphors that 
dehumanize the poor can show how power relations can be reinforced and possibly even 
transformed by language. There is then a chance for people to recognize these metaphors 
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and to start a conversation, a way for the poor to see that the language that dehumanizes 
them is a part of a larger social structure that has existed for generations—not their fault.  
 But there are ways of staging acts of heretical discourse that go beyond what an 
academic paper can do. Heretical breaks can be enacted at the federal, state, and local 
levels with the help of groups that teach the art of leadership and help organize people for 
grassroots change. After discussing in chapter two some of the metaphors that 
dehumanize the poor and then demonstrating in chapter three how anti-poor metaphors 
were institutionalized in the 1960s, this project will conclude by studying some of the 
methods that allow people to advocate for the poor by questioning language choices, 




CHAPTER II: POOR METAPHORS  
 Lakoff and Johnson argue that one of metaphor’s greatest powers is the way it 
highlights some qualities in a given comparison and hides others: “The very systematicity 
that allows us to comprehend one aspect of a concept in terms of another […] will 
necessarily hide other aspects of the concept. In allowing us to focus on one aspect of a 
concept […], a metaphorical concept can keep us from focusing on other aspects of the 
concept that are inconsistent with that metaphor” (10). The world of politics provides 
some good examples of this exact phenomenon that metaphor theory expounds upon. 
Leonard Pitts Jr. begins a 2014 Miami Herald opinion piece entitled “The face of 
poverty” with a summation of the recent views of three different politicians. All three of 
these politicians utilize interesting metaphors in the language they choose to depict the 
poor. Pitts begins with Paul Ryan: “We have got this tailspin of culture, in our inner cities 
in particular, of men not working and just generations of men not even thinking about 
working or learning the value and the culture of work” (Pitts). The “tailspin of culture” is 
an interesting metaphor in that it is the logical extreme of a much more common 
metaphor hidden inside Ryan’s rhetoric: the poor are parasites. In other words, too many 
moochers in society will lead to the very destruction (or crashing) of civilization. Pitts 
then features a statement made recently by another politician, South Carolina’s former 
Lieutenant Governor André Bauer: “You’re facilitating the problem if you give an animal 
or a (poor) person ample food supply. They will reproduce, especially ones that don’t 
think too much further than that.” It is important to note here that Bauer was talking not 
about adults who apply for food stamps, but children who receive free or reduced lunches 
through school programs (Robertson). This metaphor takes the parasite comparison in a 
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different and startling direction, comparing the poor person to a stray animal, unworthy 
of being fed, but also blaming the poor person for his own poverty. Bauer says that 
children who receive free lunches also have low test scores, the fairly explicit assumption 
being that because these children’s parents do not have to work for this food, then the 
children are somehow less intelligent than their peers. And finally, Pitts recalls Mitt 
Romney’s infamous words during his 2012 presidential bid: “There are 47 percent who 
are … dependent upon government, who believe they are victims, who believe 
government has a responsibility to care for them.” Though this is a subtler statement than 
the other two, it is another example of a politician comparing the poor to parasites.  
 These are just some examples of what Lakoff and Johnson mean when they say 
that metaphors can call attention to some qualities while hiding others. To call a child 
who is the beneficiary of a government food plan a parasite, for instance, glosses over 
how raising a well-adjusted and well-fed child will likely have positive ripple effects in 
society long into the future. There are other popular metaphors used by politicians to 
describe the poor as well, some of which will be surveyed below, and these similarly do 
not paint a full picture of reality. For example, calling poor people on government 
assistance sinful criminals, based solely on their receipt of that assistance, distracts from 
the fact that they have broken no laws in the act of seeking help from the social safety 
net. So, by comparing a poor person to an animal, a sinner, or a parasite, the speaker 
creates this less-than-fully developed conception that, to paraphrase Lakoff and Johnson, 
causes inconsistent metaphors to seem fully true (10). In Bourdieu’s words, this is what 
fuels habitus; the implicit, unconscious beliefs in a specific reality tend to support the 
23 
 
metaphors that confirm that very same conception of reality, and these beliefs reproduce 
themselves in the daily habits of the people who believe them (Logic 77).  
 Comparing a poor person to an animal, a parasite, or a sinful thief is not such a 
simplistic comparison after all. Just as Lakoff and Johnson point out, by simply 
constructing the metaphor, one forgets how complex the reality that exists behind the 
metaphor really is. Just as it can cause the American middle class to question the value of 
other human beings, language can also overrule the dehumanization process that popular 
metaphors have set in place. By understanding that much of one’s language is based on 
metaphors, some of them more apt than others, one might reconsider the ways that the 
relations of the habitus reproduce these metaphors. As stated above, the danger of these 
metaphors is that they tend to confirm a reality that has been filtered through language 
and accepted by the observer of that reality.  
 Deconstructing and refuting the negative stereotypes by which the poor are 
defined might challenge the view that the poor are objects that distract from business as 
usual and strengthen the view that they are equal human beings deserving of dignity and 
a standard level of fair treatment in society. A trend in anti-poor perceptions has 
reemerged, however, piggybacking on political movements such as the Tea Party but 
having roots in much earlier (and much more liberal) political movements such as the 
War on Poverty of the 1960s. The trend that has reemerged in the early twenty-first 
century is reminiscent of the War on Poverty days because, according to some views, the 
poor are once again solely responsible for the dire circumstances in which they find 
themselves, with little consideration going toward the systemic nature of poverty itself. 
When victims are blamed for their own victimhood, critical questions tend not to be 
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asked. People who find themselves the victims of layoffs due to economic downturns (the 
Great Recession, for instance) automatically open themselves up to public shaming, even 
though the benefits they receive (unemployment, public healthcare, and nutrition and/or 
cash assistance) are done so in private.  
 In the sections below, this project underscores some of the anti-poor rhetoric that 
has flourished in the hyper-partisan landscape of American politics in recent years. After 
focusing especially on the idea that the poor are living sinful, animalistic lives mooching 
off the state, or not using time to its fullest advantage—i.e. to make as much money as 
possible—this project will then suggest ways the poor can counteract these perceptions 
that have been unfairly brought against them. Some of these linguistic counteractions can 
be achieved by using the very governmental programs that already exist, though with the 
way SNAP policy has been written, there will likely be an expectation of heightened 
community involvement from the poor themselves. As with any issue in a republican 
democracy, the community must be willing to work to change their perceptions, but this 
change will likely never come about unless those who are the targets of these perceptions 
are also involved and engaged. Finally, in the hyper-partisan landscape that characterizes 
American politics in the early twenty-first century, any attempt to confront and change 
negative perceptions of the poor should be bipartisan and led by local organizations. 
Community groups that have deep roots in their respective regions would likely be more 
effective (and palatable) than a top-down federal approach that seeks to change people’s 
language choices on a large scale.  
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The Poor Are Animals  
 One particularly insensitive metaphor is that the poor are animals, which is an 
exaggeration of stereotypes that have long dogged the poor. Indeed, these stereotypes, 
especially those that characterize the poor as careless and refusing to think of the future, 
might be familiar to people in the rural Southeast of the United States. Even Harry M. 
Caudill, an educated advocate for the poor in Appalachia, saw “welfarism” as a big 
problem in the mountains in the 1950s and 1960s. In Night Comes to the Cumberlands: A 
Biography of a Depressed Area, he has much to say against the hazards of poverty, and 
his rhetoric against the poor themselves seems sometimes biting and quite cruel. 
Specifically, he says,  
Fertile and amoral females resided in every camp and on every creek. Illegitimate 
pregnancies increased at an ominous rate. The new unwed mothers promptly 
appeared in the Welfare offices and applied for their monthly assistance checks. 
In due course, and in all too many instances, the first “mistake” was followed by 
another and the monthly stipend grew. Some of these uninhibited women have 
blessed the state with a half-dozen new citizens, all of them supported by the 
nation’s taxpayers. One pair of sisters living in the same house began bearing 
children before their twentieth birthdays (286 – 7).  
Thus, even those who are sympathetic to the plight of the poor, as Caudill was, may use 
harsh language when discussing poverty’s deeply structural problems. The idea that 
welfare by itself fosters dependency is not a new observation, but what is striking about 
some of the new rhetorical flourishes from U.S. politicians is that their words turn 
recipients of government assistance into animals.  
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 As already noted above, in 2010, the Lieutenant Governor of South Carolina, 
André Bauer, said that welfare programs not only lead people into immediate dependency 
on the system, but they also create generational dependency. This is because children 
who receive free lunches will then grow up and “reproduce, especially ones that don’t 
think too much further than that” (Robinson). According to an article on CNN ’s website, 
he said that he had been warned about this phenomenon while growing up. “‘My 
grandmother was not a highly educated woman, but she told me as a small child to quit 
feeding stray animals,’ Bauer told an audience in the town of Fountain Inn, according to 
the Greenville News. ‘You know why? Because they breed’” (Hamby). The implication 
here is clear: their children will also be on the system, creating generational dependency 
on entitlement program benefits. In April 2013, Missouri Representative Paul Fitzwater 
made a comment quite similar to Bauer’s. Trying to explain why it is a bad idea to give 
poor people government benefits such as public healthcare, Fitzwater said, “When you go 
to the zoo, there’s a sign, that says please don’t feed the animals.” And thus he, too, has 
likened poor people on governmental assistance to animals, noting that, like the creatures 
in a zoo, “they keep coming back” (“State Lawmaker”; Lussenhop). This nonsensical 
metaphor is nevertheless much the same indelicate idea that Caudill was trying to get at 
when he described the desperate “welfarism” that had exploded in Appalachia in the 
1960s. People got hooked on free money, just as animals get accustomed to free food, 
and they could not help but return for more.  
 As Lakoff and Johnson might do, one can ask, “How is the metaphor that the poor 
person is an animal inconsistent with the full reality of that person’s situation?” To put it 
in terms of Bourdieu’s theories, one could go further and ask, “How does this implicit 
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belief (that the poor on government assistance are animals) replicate itself in the daily 
habits of people who hold such a belief?” The metaphor of poor people on aid being 
animals is inconsistent because it is overly simplistic, and it reproduces itself in the 
discussions that people have as well as the votes that they cast. How is the metaphor 
inconsistent? While there is a distinction between normalized, socially adjusted animals 
(such as the kind that can adequately take care of their young) and stray animals that 
people might kick away from their doorsteps, in the natural world such distinctions are 
not so easily drawn. Indeed, in the above paragraph, Bauer is comparing poor people to 
stray animals, which makes the metaphor all the more piercing to the person on the 
receiving end. Stray animals, according to humans living in a well-ordered society, have 
no purpose. They are animals whose sole meaning in life is to annoy, beg, and leach off 
society. To call a person a stray animal, therefore, is first to refuse that person his or her 
dignity and second to fail to see the broader picture of how nature works well inside its 
own globe. In other words, even a stray animal has a purpose somewhere, somehow. Yet 
still the popular perception persists: an animal cannot have a purpose equal to that of a 
human’s, because an animal is naturally less than a human. Fitzwater, meanwhile, is 
comparing the poor to zoo animals, which is also problematic. Zoo animals are helpless, 
and a sort of paternalism demands that humans care for them. Both stray animals and zoo 
animals are clearly less valuable than humans, according to these conceptions.  
 As noted above with the example of Caudill, one recognizes today’s rhetoric as 
having roots in earlier discussions, and the 1960s and 1970s in particular set the stage for 
many of today’s political battles. The question of how the government should help the 
poor is still a topic of heated debate, and much of this has to do with the fact that many 
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Americans are still speaking in the same language, understanding the poor with 
metaphors similar to the ones they did back then. Indeed, a lot of disparaging metaphors 
have come to characterize the poor in the United States, many of which appear to 
originate from a basic question of fairness.  
The Poor Are Parasites  
 Another metaphor that politicians use, perhaps without even realizing they are 
invoking it, is that the poor are parasites, unfairly gaming the system or draining society 
of its resources. That they are not aware they are invoking this metaphor shows how 
unconsciously held these beliefs can be, which means they are especially difficult to 
overcome because they can slip out without their speakers intending them to. Perhaps 
most famous were Mitt Romney’s disastrous comments about the forty-seven percent of 
Americans who depend on government in some form or fashion to get by. He made these 
comments at the height of the 2012 presidential campaign while being recorded by a 
hidden camera. His full quote, though certainly nuanced and perhaps not totally deserving 
of the backlash it engendered, was unfortunate and even thoughtless at times:  
There are forty-seven percent of the people who will vote for the president no 
matter what. All right, there are forty-seven percent who are with him, who are 
dependent upon government, who believe that they are victims, who believe the 
government has a responsibility to care for them, who believe that they are 
entitled to health care, to food, to housing, to you-name-it. That’s an entitlement. 
The government should give it to them. And they will vote for this president no 
matter what. And I mean the president starts off with forty-eight, forty-nine, 
forty—he starts off with a huge number. These are people who pay no income tax. 
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Forty-seven percent of Americans pay no income tax. So our message of low 
taxes doesn’t connect. So he’ll be out there talking about tax cuts for the rich. My 
job is not to worry about those people. I’ll never convince them they should take 
personal responsibility and care for their lives. What I have to do is convince the 
five to ten percent in the center that are independents, that are thoughtful, that 
look at voting one way or the other depending upon in some cases emotion, 
whether they like the guy or not (“Mitt Romney’s ‘47 Percent’ Comments”).  
First of all, what disturbed people so greatly about these indelicate comments was how 
this presidential candidate, generally seen as a very compassionate man and a devout 
Christian, did not seem to care at that moment about roughly half of the nation’s 
population. In fact, what was so shocking about this instance of political rhetoric was to 
see such a high-level candidate espousing this disparaging view of people in need. Of 
course, as has been seen with the sudden political ascendency of Donald Trump, a 
candidate will say virtually anything to get noticed. And Romney’s tilt to the Right 
during the 2012 Republican primaries and then the general election—to be the political 
chimera or shape-shifter his campaign team thought the American people needed him to 
be—may have ironically been a part of the same phenomenon, a sort of conservative 
fervor, now fueling Trump’s ascendency. But what is also troubling about Romney’s 
comments is that they echo the popular (and oftentimes conservative) distrust of 
programs that help people in need. Usually a thoughtful man who chooses his words 
carefully, Romney made comments here that fed into the echo chamber of fiscally 
conservative politics that prey on people’s fears and bring up issues of trust and fairness, 
depicting the poor person who accesses government aid as somehow gaming the system.  
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 Second, Romney’s comments were especially offensive because of the implicit 
metaphor hiding inside them: the poor are parasites. The idea that the poor are leaching 
off the government is not a new metaphor, and, in fact, “parasite” has been, for years, an 
especially popular label to use as a criticism of the poor who are on government 
antipoverty programs. Public figures like Romney are often understandably guarded with 
their opinions, and so catching a politician or a pundit in an offensive turn of phrase can 
be difficult. In fact, while Romney himself did not explicitly call government aid 
recipients “moochers” or “parasites,” many people were able to read the subtext of his 
comments and responded forcefully. In an article in Florida’s Palm Beach Post, Frank 
Cerabino looks at some political numbers to explain why both affluent and impoverished 
parts of Florida were likely going to vote for Romney in the 2012 election. In his article’s 
opening, Cerabino sarcastically admonishes the poor people of Florida:  
Listen up, moochers. / You know who you are. Don’t be looking all innocent. 
Florida is among the top 10 states when it comes to the percentage of federal 
income tax filers who pay no federal income tax. / So I know you’re out there. 
And the jig is up. All those good times you poor people have been getting away 
with are coming to an end. / Step away from the nursing home, Grandma. Give 
back that child-tax credit, low-wage working mom. And all you smart-aleck 
teens: Don’t even dream of burdening us with your subsidized college educations. 
[…] Thinking nobody was recording his words, Romney really gave it to you 
moochers, the 47 percent of Americans who don’t make enough money to owe 
any federal income tax.  
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Perhaps intelligent and powerful people such as Romney do not wish to make these 
metaphors explicit because they do not actually believe them; they may believe, however, 
that their constituents believe them. This is another one of metaphor’s powers: sometimes 
only a suggestion of the image is needed before people will see the image fully developed 
in their minds. This is because they already believe the inherent truth of the metaphor, 
which allows politicians a level of deniability because they are speaking to their 
constituents in a sort of code, which makes identifying the actual audience quite difficult. 
“You see,” Cerabino concludes, “when it comes to bad mouthing the moochers, it’s best 
to be as vague as possible, so the moochers think you must be talking about somebody 
other than them.” If this is true, then analyzing politicians’ comments and pointing out 
the inconsistent metaphors hiding inside becomes all the more important.  
 Indeed, public figures may be guarded with their phrasing, but those on the 
receiving end of these metaphors clearly feel their sting. In a 1994 Washington Post 
editorial, for instance, contributor Kathryn James poses the question in a startlingly direct 
way: “Must those of us who receive social services really be subjected to stereotypes that 
categorize all of us as lazy, uneducated parasites, endlessly feeding off the welfare 
system?” (James). Media, especially the column, opinion, and editorial sections, offer 
snapshots in time such as these and give subtext to national dialogues. They tell the 
stories of people whose lives are touched by economic instability. “Jan Bach never 
imagined, 10 years ago, that she would end up on welfare, much less find herself being 
assailed in congressional hearings—like others in her situation—as some kind of social 
parasite.” Thus begins a Denver Post article from June 1995 during the Clinton 
Administration’s attempts to pass Welfare Reform, which ultimately put time limits on 
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cash grants to the poor. Bach was once a member of the middle class, the article explains, 
but after having a disabled child, her life changed. Not wanting to place her daughter into 
foster care, she made the decision to “descend into poverty” so that she could qualify for 
government healthcare, “joining the 20 to 25 percent of welfare recipients who need 
public aid mainly because it is the only way they can get care for serious long-term health 
problems.” Bach pushes back against stereotypes that she has perceived being leveled 
against her and others who are poor, and the metaphors that support these stereotypes are 
evident in her language: “‘I don’t look at myself as a moocher or a leech on society,’ says 
Bach, who lives with her daughter in a neat Adams County mobile-home park. ‘I view 
myself as one of the hardest-working members of the community, in trying to educate 
others to accept people with differences,’ she says” (Cox).  
The Poor Are Sinners and Criminals  
 According to some political rhetoric, the poor who access government aid are not 
just animals and parasites, but they are also people of questionable morality. This 
assumption, though shocking, has deep roots in society’s popular perceptions of the poor. 
Even so-called “sin taxes” are typically levied against products that the poor are seen as 
disproportionately using. When used in excess, products such as cigarettes, alcohol, and 
lottery tickets can have deleterious effects on a person’s physique and psyche. Therefore, 
a “sin tax” is a way of discouraging the poor from taking part in self-destructive habits, a 
sort of paternalism adopted by the wider society that sees the poor as unable to take care 
of themselves. That paternalistic view may well be why “the poor are sinners” remains 
such a popular metaphor. Ironically, at the same time, this paternalism also accepts the 
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metaphors that reinforce negative views of poor people and allow for basic assistance to 
be withheld unless they conform (and reform) in ways that society deems appropriate.  
 The sin tax may seem like a modern-day invention, but the perception of poor 
people as sinners goes back much further than contemporary times. Where such a belief 
came from becomes clearer, at least in part, when one considers the history of this nation, 
as well as the history of Western capitalism itself. Perhaps no scholar on the success of 
Protestant individualism is more citable and emblematic than Max Weber, the author of 
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Weber explains that in a religion that 
favored only a small number of elite (or saved) souls, the practitioners of Protestantism, 
and especially of Calvinism, had to look for ways to prove to themselves that God had 
selected them for eternal rewards. He says,  
For, in conformity with the Old Testament and in analogy to the ethical valuation 
of good works, asceticism looked upon the pursuit of wealth as an end in itself as 
highly reprehensible; but the attainment of it as a fruit of labour in a calling was a 
sign of God’s blessing. And even more important: the religious valuation of 
restless, continuous, systematic work in a worldly calling, as the highest means to 
asceticism, and at the same time the surest and most evident proof of rebirth and 
genuine faith, must have been the most powerful conceivable lever for the 
expansion of that attitude toward life which we have here called the spirit of 
capitalism (116).  
The argument that those who have accrued some measure of wealth have received God’s 
blessings (and that, by contrast, those who are poor will suffer further, and even eternal, 
retribution) resurfaces in the contemporary American culture. It is a self-fulfilling 
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prophecy—or, as Bourdieu might say, a self-perpetuating metaphor. To those who are 
financially stable, the Protestant work ethic must indeed seem quite beautiful when 
considered alongside a doctrine of predestination. Under this paradigm, God chooses 
only a select few in every generation to succeed, and they will commit their lives to hard 
work and good, faithful deeds. All the while, the fruits of their labor prove that they are 
doing good work. The hardworking, entrepreneurial spirit characteristic of the Protestant 
is what made so many people in capitalistic nations—and by extension, the nations 
themselves—so rich, according to Weber (5 – 7). Unfortunately, this paradigm also 
leaves out a certain segment of the population—namely, those whose poverty seems to 
prove their immorality. Not only are the poor “broke,” meaning they have no money; 
they are also morally broken.  
 Indeed, according to some, the poor person on government aid is a type of 
transgressor who has supposedly broken such an innate law that now he or she is 
unredeemable. Or perhaps the person is only redeemable by a method that will both 
prove his or her sinfulness and then fix the problem. Mandating that welfare recipients 
take drug tests in exchange for their benefits is a perfect example of the assumption that 
poverty makes a person morally deviant. Those who espouse these views may scramble 
multiple metaphors into one image, equating welfare recipients with, for instance, 
thieves, sinners, and moochers in the same thought. In a March 2015 article in the Ohio-
based Lima News, for instance, Thomas Lucente offers his commentary on the issue:  
If you want the government to steal my money and give it to you, then stop 
whining about taking a drug test. / Seriously. / If you are a beneficiary of 
America’s growing welfare state, a recipient of the money government has stolen 
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from others to redistribute as it sees fit, then you need to be to tested for drugs. / 
[…] This is not a violation of anyone’s rights. The drug testing would not be 
mandatory. One is never required to take the stolen loot from the state. However, 
if one wants to enjoy the fruits of someone else’s labor, then one should not be 
wasting that so-called largesse on drugs, liquor, and other luxuries. Basic 
subsistence and shelter. And basic means basic (Lucente).  
A theme seen commonly in such critiques of government assistance is that the poor are 
using unfairly redistributed taxpayer dollars to live better than the hard-working middle 
class: “basic means basic.” This is an attempt to equate the receipt of welfare with the sin 
of theft. The response to such a sin is often to publicly shame the recipients, which is an 
outmoded, even a puritanical, form of punishment. From this view, the very fact that the 
poor may need subsistence assistance is proof in and of itself that they have done morally 
wrong, and so some of their necessities (such as adequate food and shelter) should be 
taken from them unless they conform to certain standards. The opinion piece continues: 
“Your typical ‘poor’ person lives in a normal dwelling that is larger than that of the 
average non-poor European. Nearly 40 percent of the poor own their own homes. Poor 
children have the same protein and nutrient intakes as upper middle-class children” 
(Lucente). The implication here is clear: even though Lucente says that “basic means 
basic,” the poor do not deserve to have even their basic needs met unless they can prove 
that they are worthy of receiving the assistance.  
 Indeed, the images conveyed by these metaphors may be over-the-top or even 
reminiscent of characters in literature who are, ironically, quite heroic despite the society 
of their day labeling them as sinners. Hester Prynne in The Scarlet Letter is an example. 
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In the same Washington Post editorial mentioned above, Kathryn James describes her 
interaction with a woman behind her in the checkout line who scoffs upon noticing that 
James is wearing a cashmere coat and paying with food stamps. The woman immediately 
assumes that a fellow shopper paying with government aid should not be able to afford 
such a nice coat. When asked where she bought it, James responds, “The Salvation 
Army.” After detailing the various ways that she was once successful before poverty 
unexpectedly upended her life, the editorialist concludes in sarcastic fashion:  
Perhaps those of us who have fallen on devastating times and need the social 
services our tax money once helped fund, should wear signs pinned to our 
clothing each time we leave home—a scarlet letter for the ’90s. The signs would 
outline—for all who feel they deserve to know—the reasons why we have 
resorted to collecting government entitlements. Further, the signs could inform 
readers of the place of purchase and cost of all our clothing, jewelry and 
accessories and whether they were obtained pre- or post-poverty. (James).  
James then puts this sentence in parentheses: “(By the way, those who think the welfare 
system is a mechanism to get rich quick better check the facts.)” This parenthetical 
statement makes her point seem like a side note, but this is a fitting way to make such a 
statement because she is highlighting a metaphor that is oftentimes only implicit in anti-
poor political rhetoric: to be poor is to be unethical, a criminal, a sinner, someone who is 
trying to game the system for personal gain, or even an evildoer.  
 Perhaps no one has put this more forcefully than Rush Limbaugh. “Welfare,” says 
Limbaugh, “is the willful absconding of money owned by others and giving it to other 
people for your benefit, not theirs.” Not only is this theft, he says, but he also points out 
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that welfare never works anyway. “Liberals are not giving people money to […] improve 
their lifestyles. It doesn’t happen, does it? The poor are still poor. The homeless are still 
homeless. Despite all these great liberal programs, the numbers, the percentages never 
change” (Limbaugh). However, Limbaugh fails to offer any proof of his own that the 
statistics do not change, that government assistance programs do nothing to help lift 
people out of their own poverty. Limbaugh does not stop there, however, and he even 
turns welfare into something of a sinner’s institution, comparing it to the theft of one to 
give to another (or others).  
If I may be blunt, the purpose of welfare is to create as many people as possible 
who refuse to help themselves because they don’t have to anymore. They’ve got 
welfare plans. Welfare is robbing Peter to buy Paul’s vote. It’s insidious. It 
destroys people’s humanity and their dignity. It takes away their ambition, their 
desires and gives them a life of squalor, under the guise of big-heartedness and 
charity and so forth.  
Advocates of antipoverty programs, however, might refute the people who argue along 
the same lines as Limbaugh. According to a report entitled The Effect of SNAP on 
Poverty:  
In summary, the SNAP program currently costs one half of one percent (.5 
percent) of GDP (Moffitt, 2013). For that amount we get a 16 percent reduction in 
poverty (8 million fewer poor people) after an adjustment for underreporting, 
based on USDA administrative data. Moreover we get a 41 percent cut in the 
poverty gap, which measures the depth of poverty and a 54 percent decline in the 
severity of poverty, when we add SNAP benefits to Census money incomes and 
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recalculate the official poverty rate. No other program for the nonelderly does 
such a great job preventing poverty, or alleviating poverty’s weight on those who 
remain poor. We should be heralding and celebrating this success, not trying to 
reduce the program because it goes to those who don’t need it (Tiehen, et al 20).  
Clearly, antipoverty initiatives such as SNAP, while not perfect, do appear to help keep 
people out of poverty. There may be some fraudulent recipients, but the available data 
largely point to a well-run program. According to the website of the USDA, which is the 
federal agency that administers the SNAP program, “Payment accuracy has never been 
higher: in FY 2010, 96.19 percent of all benefits were issued correctly.” Welfare 
programs such as SNAP help people in great need, many of whom are either hard 
workers in their own right or unable to work. The USDA also points out on its website: 
“Most SNAP recipients were children or elderly. Nearly half (48 percent) were children 
and another 8 percent were age 60 or older. Working-age women represented 28 percent 
of the caseload, while working-age men represented 16 percent” (USDA, “Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP): Section 824 - Work Requirement (ABAWD)”).  
 However, a belief persists that the act of being poor makes the poor criminals, 
even sinners. This is clear in a variety of articles in the historical archives. In a 
Washington Post opinion piece from March 1981, columnist Richard Cohen argues that 
government has a mandate to provide certain basic services to all people, no matter their 
socioeconomic status. He is ashamed and angry to witness the termination of some 
programs (such as guaranteed legal services for the poor) accompanied by the 
implementation of new policies (such as requiring the poor to work for welfare). He says 
that targeting the poor in this way “is neither new nor rooted in economics. It is as old as 
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holding the poor, all the poor, accountable for their own poverty, for seeing them as 
somehow having chosen to be poor, to live off the government, to bum, to be parasites. It 
is a demon theory of the poor—evil that must be punished. It seems that being poor is 
never punishment enough” (Cohen).  
 The metaphors that the poor are animals, parasites, criminals, and sinners are 
fascinating ones, especially when they tend to blend into one another. For instance, 
Romney’s forty-seven percent comment could easily be characterized as both espousing 
the “sinner” as well as the “parasite” metaphor. These metaphors are also exaggerations 
of prevalent stereotypes, and they do a good job of justifying these same stereotypes: the 
poor are lazy, unwilling to work, and therefore undeserving. The stereotypes of the poor 
person on government assistance are often cruel and inaccurate, but what’s more is that 
they tend to make sweeping, even dangerous generalizations. For instance, if a small 
number of people in a given system (such as those on the food stamp program) are 
corrupt, then the entire system must also be corrupt, or so the generalization assumes. 
This is a fascinating (not to mention fallacious) stereotype that shows just how powerful a 
metaphor can be. Just a few “bad apples” (i.e. those receiving government assistance 
fraudulently) become the standard representation of all those who are in need of financial 
assistance. In this way, society’s business-oriented expenses (such as the funding of 
roads) can still be called “investments,” whereas a program such as food stamps becomes 
a “subsidy,” which may have more of a negative connotation in some people’s minds.  
The Modern Origins of the Negative Perceptions of Government Aid Recipients  
 Since at least the early sixties, newspapers have been confronting—and in some 
cases perpetuating—the stereotype that certain members of the poor are lazy and should 
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therefore not receive government handouts. Before that, the food stamp program appears 
to have been perceived as a fairly innocuous federal subsidy program. Milo Perkins, who 
directed the program in its earliest days, used an apt metaphor to describe what food 
stamps sought to accomplish: “‘We got a picture of a gorge, with farm surpluses on one 
cliff and under-nourished city folks with outstretched hands on the other. We set out to 
find a practical way to build a bridge across that chasm’” (Pepperl). It wasn’t until the 
1960s, when President Lyndon B. Johnson began his social welfare campaign known as 
the War on Poverty, when the food stamp program—and, by extension, its recipients—
was used as political fodder in antipoverty budgetary battles.  
 This should not be surprising. Johnson’s attempts were an unprecedented 
expansion of federal funding for the purposes of lifting millions of people out of poverty. 
From the very beginning, it received massive conservative pushback, and, as always, 
newspapers of the day do a good job of documenting the political rancor. “President 
Johnson today defended his anti-poverty program against charges by Sen. Barry 
Goldwater that it is destructive of individual responsibility and initiative,” says Mary 
Pakenham in a Chicago Tribune article from 1964. In the article, Johnson holds up the 
food stamp program as a good example of what federal funding can do in the lives of the 
poor. Goldwater pushes back, saying that federal funds would be better spent creating 
jobs for the poor. “He [Goldwater] said, in another speech the same day, that ‘the 
dreadful “great society” is one in which there will be no penalty for failure, because in it 
there will be no reward for success. In it there will be no individual responsibility and, 
therefore, no freedom.’” Johnson retorts that “‘Giving a man a chance to work, and feed 
his family, and provide for his children does not destroy initiative. Hunger destroys 
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initiative. Ignorance destroys initiative. A cold and indifferent government destroys 
initiative’” (Pakenham). This argument was an act of political theatre, playing out over 
multiple speeches between the two men, and it paints a picture of the same partisan 
divide that we see in today’s politics.  
 By the 1970s, the food stamp program itself has come under considerable political 
attack. In a Washington Post editorial, Jodie T. Allen and Robinson G. Hollister Jr. 
defend the program against its detractors, using a humorous animal metaphor in the 
beginning of the piece: “One in 11 Americans uses food stamps. One out of five is 
eligible to use them. Is a ‘food stampede’ underway which will dwarf the ‘welfare 
explosion’ of the ’60s?” (Allen and Robinson). As if to push back against detractors of 
government assistance who imply that the poor are criminals for accessing that 
assistance, they go on to argue that a federal food stamp program is not only necessary, 
but also in line with certain Judeo-Christian religious morals. “Naturally, the never-
ending debate about the program has grown in volume. But coming out frankly in favor 
of abolishing a program to feed the poor is like opposing the Ten Commandments. So, 
instead of attacking the program’s principles, critics tend to talk about abuses or fatal 
faults.” But these attacks against the “abuses [and] fatal faults” of the food stamp 
program are exactly how certain anti-poor stereotypes are engineered and then 
perpetuated:  
Decades-old complaints about welfare cheats were revived during a recent 
congressional battle to check the rise in food stamp prices. Sen. Milton Young (R-
N.D.) said the program’s participants included “hippies in communes who don’t 
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want to work.” Sen. Herman Talmadge (D-Ga.) described a man in a Cadillac 
who bought $189 worth of steak with food stamps (Allen and Robinson).  
These are the people, as Mitt Romney said in more recent years, whom conservative 
politicians need not worry about; these are the people, in other words, who do not matter, 
or whose votes do not matter, because they will never be persuaded to see the issues from 
the viewpoint of the political Right.  
 That is exactly why these rhetorical metaphors are so dangerous: the poor are 
generally stuck in their ways because to be something (such as a parasite or a sinner) is to 
be that thing permanently. The poor who are on government aid therefore cannot lift 
themselves out of their own poverty because they do not want to, and so, in a way, they 
are a hopeless cause; the senator in the above example called them “‘hippies in 
communes who don’t want to work.’” They are not worth the time and effort—again, 
time is money—to save. In the end, their government aid should be stripped from them 
because there is no better way to motivate them than to get them back to work.  
 This is a seductive argument that, firstly, blames victims for their own oppression 
and, secondly, does not enter into deeper questions about how the observer’s own views 
of the poor could change if some consideration were made to the language choices that 
support those views. If the poor on government aid can be said to be less than human in 
some way, then one can argue that this characterization relies solely on people’s ability to 
turn time and effort into money. If people are not very good at managing money or if they 
have no idea how to make money at all, then they will suffer under a variety of pejorative 
labels. They might be lazy animals who find themselves relying on government 
assistance. Then, too, they will be seen as parasitic animals for permanently sapping the 
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resources of society, and criminals or even sinners for stealing the hard-earned money of 
others. Perhaps, in the end, they even contribute to the destruction of society. These are 
all metaphors that have been spoken at one time or another. These metaphors (the poor as 
criminals and sinners, parasitic animals, destructors, etc.), despite being bombastic, are 
seductive because they seem to have an element of truth to them. The speakers who speak 
these metaphors, the voters who vote with these beliefs in mind, do so unconsciously. 
They believe that if no one works and everyone expects to get free stuff, then society 
itself will cease to work. They believe that people on the system are getting by without 
having to work, which, if true, would be unfair. Rarely entering into this mental calculus 
is the realization that many people on government aid were, and still are, hard workers 
who have fallen on difficult times. Also not entering into such a discussion is a 




CHAPTER III: “THE WAR ON POVERTY” AND “CULTURE OF POVERTY” 
THEORY  
 The habit of speaking in ways that dehumanize the poor ironically came to 
national prominence in the 1960s with the popularization and then bureaucratic 
implementation of the culture of poverty theory, which was a framework that could have 
been Bourdieu’s case in point. It was a framework attempting to explain the habits of the 
poor, but because of the underdeveloped understanding of the poor that it promoted, it did 
an insufficient job of easing poverty in chronically depressed areas. Looking at the 
history of the culture of poverty theory is important because the overall goal of this 
project is to show how using certain metaphors to understand the poor is actually a way 
of transposing one’s own cultural assumptions onto the experiences of others, which is a 
worthwhile phenomenon to recognize if one’s ultimate aim is to overcome his or her 
preconceptions of the oppressed. One of the ways of reordering one’s conceptions of 
reality is to recognize that the metaphors that reinforce that reality came into existence at 
a certain time and a specific place. In other words, as Bourdieu says, the structuring 
structures that feed oppression are only tacit, not permanent; they had a beginning, so 
they could have an ending as well.  
 There may be hopeful signs on the horizon. The preceding chapter focused on 
contemporary attacks on the poor, which typically come from fiscal conservatives. 
However, even some of these opponents of government assistance have been 
backpedaling their fierce rhetoric from recent years. Paul Ryan, the current Speaker of 
the U.S. House of Representatives, recently came out against some of the harsh attacks 
that have come to characterize the 2016 presidential campaign. According to an article in 
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The Boston Globe, “In the most striking part of his speech, Ryan was self-critical, saying 
that he should not have referred to the ‘makers and takers’ in society when he was the 
Republican vice presidential nominee in 2012. ‘As I spent more time listening, and really 
learning the root causes of poverty, I realized I was wrong,’ said Ryan, who has made 
attacking poverty a central goal of the House” (“Paul Ryan”). The most important and 
promising part about such revelations is that when powerful people begin to understand 
how their rhetoric can shape the national dialogue, then the tone of the conversation 
might start to change as well. Both Democrats and Republicans are guilty of espousing 
anti-poor rhetoric, whether they mean to or not, and so, as Lakoff, Johnson, and Bourdieu 
would note, one of the most nefarious characteristics of oppressive rhetoric is that those 
who employ it may not realize that, in doing so, they are dehumanizing the oppressed.  
 The focus of this section now turns to the way negative perceptions of the poor, 
reinforced by language choices, can become legitimized and even institutionalized by the 
dominant speakers in society, such as the media and government. In some cases, as will 
be shown below, this institutionalization of anti-poor assumptions even led some 
antipoverty workers, such as those who swept into the Appalachian Mountains during the 
War on Poverty, to attempt to convince the poor that they were inadequate and inferior. 
As a concept, the culture of poverty theory was a widely accepted cluster of metaphors 
and stereotypes, including the idea that the poor were caught in a “tangle of pathologies,” 
used as a convenient way to view the impoverished and explain their habits (Gale). 
According to the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences,  
The culture of poverty theory states that living in conditions of pervasive poverty 
will lead to the development of a culture or subculture adapted to those 
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conditions. This culture is characterized by pervasive feelings of helplessness, 
dependency, marginality, and powerlessness. Furthermore, [the anthropologist 
Oscar] Lewis described individuals living within a culture of poverty as having 
little or no sense of history and therefore lacking the knowledge to alleviate their 
own conditions through collective action, instead focusing solely on their own 
troubles. Thus, for Lewis, the imposition of poverty on a population was the 
structural cause of the development of a culture of poverty, which then becomes 
autonomous, as behaviors and attitudes developed within a culture of poverty get 
passed down to subsequent generations through socialization processes (Gale).  
This framework assumes that people are poor because they have learned to be poor, and 
their culture perpetuates their poverty. They will likely not help themselves—that is, will 
refuse to stop being poor—because they are more comfortable living in situations they 
recognize and understand than risking having their cultural norms challenged, even if acts 
such as questioning why they are poor and what made them poor could make their lives 
better.  
 Interestingly, the culture of poverty was reinforced by some of the same 
stereotypes that this project has already identified in the contemporary political climate. 
Among these stereotypes is the one that assumes that the poor person is a maladjusted 
strain (or parasite) on society’s resources: “This culture is characterized by pervasive 
feelings of helplessness, dependency, marginality, and powerlessness” (Gale). The poor 
are also criminals, and their poverty makes this necessarily true: “The culture of poverty 
theory presumes the development of a set of deviant norms, whereby behaviors like drug 
use and gang participation are viewed as the standard (normative) and even desired 
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behaviors of those living in the ghetto” (Gale). The culture of poverty also embraced 
other stereotypes, including the idea that the poor are broken: “[Assistant Labor Secretary 
Daniel Patrick] Moynihan argued that the origins of this deviant family structure lay in 
slavery, where the destruction of the ‘traditional’ family ‘broke the will of the Negro 
people,’ particularly black males” (Gale). The above examples clearly illustrate that 
metaphors similar to the ones this project has already uncovered in more recent instances 
of political rhetoric were in widespread use and were, at least at first, largely recognized 
as true in the 1960s.  
 The culture of poverty theory was also reinforced by many other metaphors that 
have not yet been explored in this analysis. Reformers to Radicals: The Appalachian 
Volunteers and the War on Poverty is a book by Thomas Kiffmeyer about the 
government-funded poverty workers who came to chronically depressed areas such as 
Appalachia. Kiffmeyer provides examples of troubling metaphors used by media to 
depict the poor, emphasizing them with quotation marks in the original text. He says,  
What is interesting about [Louisville Courier-Journal reporter Jim] Hampton’s 
article is that it constitutes a graphic illustration of the way in which many 
Americans saw Appalachia, the region’s problems, and the solution to those 
problems. In short, Hampton provides more information about the modern 
American than about the Southern mountain region and its people. Propagating a 
view that was by the early 1960s nearly a century old, he characterizes Mill Creek 
as a “settlement” that was “locked” in the “mold of yesterday” and would clearly 
remain so until outsiders, representative of the modern world, intervened to “lift” 
it “out of its backwardness.” Clearly, a setting such as Hampton’s Louisville 
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represented better than anything Mill Creek had to offer proper American culture 
and values (56).  
Reports such as this one are rich in metaphors that clearly define the poor as “other” and 
deviant. As members of a “settlement,” they exist in a simpler time (a “mold of 
yesterday”) that harkens back to outdated traditions, perhaps the same ones of their 
ancestors who had settled this region. The need for intervention that sought to “lift” the 
region “out of its backwardness” shows that the Appalachian region in particular—and 
impoverished people in general—are below the industrial American middle class; the 
poor are also going backwards, not forwards. These are all intriguing metaphors, 
especially because, without the emphasis of the quotation marks, they might have slipped 
by unnoticed when spoken aloud or read silently. Again, this is a danger of language: 
metaphors tend to reinforce unconscious belief, exactly as Bourdieu predicts, because 
they are created for that very act of reinforcement.  
 On the one hand, the culture of poverty theory may seem to have some overlap 
with Bourdieu’s theories, which would be a fair assessment at first glance. He does say, 
after all, that people’s (including the poor’s) understanding of reality is based on tacit 
beliefs and that they reenact their understanding of reality at all times through habit. This 
understanding of Bourdieu’s theories of doxa and habitus would certainly support the 
argument that he saw people crafting cultures that kept them oppressed. On the other 
hand, Bourdieu’s theories are different in two ways. First, he asked the oppressors, not 
just the oppressed, to look inward at their own language choices, something the culture of 
poverty theory does not do. Second, he had hope that the oppressed (as well as their 
oppressors) could question that oppression by participating in acts of heretical discourse, 
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which will be discussed further in the next chapter. Indeed, in the culture of poverty 
theory, there can be no attempt to allow the oppressed the option of questioning where 
their own oppression comes from because, the theory assumes, they either do not know 
how to or simply do not want to: “The culture of poverty assumes that culture itself is 
relatively fixed and unchanging—that once a population exists within the culture of 
poverty, no amount of intervention in terms of the alleviation of poverty will change the 
cultural attitudes and behaviors held by members of that population” (Gale). The culture 
of poverty theory, just like all beliefs, is so dangerous not only because it seems true but 
also because it confirms people’s preconceptions of its truth, just as Bourdieu predicts.  
 Indeed, as Bourdieu notes, a great concern with language is that, on the surface of 
things, people actually have very little choice in the words they use, which explains why 
conceptions, such as the culture of poverty theory, are able to replicate themselves and 
then continue to seem to be true. The phenomenon of language’s self-replication 
continues, Bourdieu says, until a closer examination of one’s language choices takes 
place, and the reason heretical discourse is so important is because once people 
unconsciously accept as true their conceptions of reality, it can be very difficult to break 
them of their beliefs. The real danger of letting unanalyzed language choices define 
reality is that these language choices then seep into the mainstream culture and become 
accepted, even institutionalized. Then they become even more difficult to overcome. 
Indeed, at times, negative metaphors regarding the poor can become so entrenched in the 
dominant narrative of society that even the agencies that seek to help the poor are 
saturated with them, and these antipoverty institutions then risk failing to be of much help 
at all. Again, the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences states:  
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The related notions of a culture of poverty and a culture of dependency have 
become the foundations for antipoverty legislation, such as Temporary Assistance 
for Needy Families, enacted in 1997 and reauthorized in 2005 as a part of welfare 
reform. This and other programs rely on the assumption that behavior generates 
poverty, citing the need to end the dependence of the poor on government benefits 
and promote work and marriage as social norms (Gale).  
While work and marriage and less government dependency might indeed be desirable 
outcomes in one’s life, they do not address the assumptions surrounding poverty, namely 
that until a person has a job, is married, and is no longer on assistance, he or she is 
somehow socially abnormal.  
 In its emphasis on finding people jobs and encouraging marriage, the TANF 
program provides a good example of how the culture of poverty theory may still be a 
stubbornly mainstream conception of reality in the minds of many Americans. And yet it 
pales in comparison to earlier initiatives that were also guided by the culture of poverty 
theory in an effort to understand the poor and why they live the way they do. Long before 
the welfare reforms of the 1990s, the culture of poverty helped define the conceptions of 
the poor in the 1960s when the federal government sought to lift millions out of desperate 
poverty. Indeed, the culture of poverty theory hindered the War on Poverty from the very 
start. Although the War on Poverty was waged all over the country, from urban ghettos to 
Native American reservations, Appalachia provides a good case study for how ineffective 
the culture of poverty was in helping antipoverty workers understand the causes of 
poverty. Appalachia has long had pockets of chronic poverty and was thus one of the 
areas the government invested in heavily with new federal programs aimed at alleviating 
51 
 
poverty. Guided by the culture of poverty theory and therefore assuming that their 
cultural experiences, their social expectations, and their middle class upbringings were 
somehow more valid (or even healthier) than those of the mountaineers whom they 
sought to lift out of poverty, the Appalachian Volunteers of the 1960s were a new breed 
of federally funded cultural warriors who often misunderstood (or even totally ignored) 
the complex economic, social, and political machinations that had worked for decades to 
keep the rural poor in their place. In Reformers to Radicals, Kiffmeyer explains how 
detrimental the underdeveloped assumptions of poverty warriors were in helping the rural 
poor. “First,” says Kiffmeyer, “the reformers’ generalizations about mountain schools 
and teachers transcended physical conditions and implied that virtually all rural 
mountaineers, adults as well as children, were insufficiently educated, unimaginative, 
unable to express themselves, and socially inadequate” (208). The Appalachian 
Volunteers believed that they needed to convince the mountaineers of their own 
inadequacies, forcing them to accept the helping hands that sought to change the 
mountaineers themselves, rather than change the economic, social, and political 
environment that had kept them in poverty for generations. “This perspective,” Kiffmeyer 
continues, “prevented the Volunteers themselves from delving beyond surface 
appearances or discovering their own class biases. In fact, this perspective precluded any 
sort of class or economic analysis” (208). Kiffmeyer then refutes a popular Appalachian 
stereotype supported by the insider/outsider dichotomy, which is itself an intriguing 
metaphor. Kiffmeyer says, “While most histories, either popular or scholarly, of the 
region portray the mountaineers as the ones to perpetuate the insider/outsider dichotomy, 
a closer look reveals that, in many cases, including the War on Poverty, it was the 
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activists who saw the mountaineers as outsiders because they did not represent what the 
outside world considered normative” (208). This is one example of what Kiffmeyer 
means when he says that the poverty workers, who came into the mountains already 
convinced the mountaineers were deficient, had no reason to critically analyze these 
metaphors.  
 One of the more interesting facts about the culture of poverty theory is that the 
author credited with its original description appears to have never meant for an entire 
generalized population to be defined under such terms. According to Kenneth L. Deavers 
and Robert A. Hoppe in Rural Poverty in America, the culture of poverty model arose out 
of Oscar Lewis’s attempts to describe a fairly small percentage within the larger 
population of people living below the federal poverty guidelines. In other words, the 
culture of poverty, as defined by Lewis, was meant to connote a subculture, “about 20 
percent of the poverty population,” and did not, at least initially, signify a full-blown 
culture (7). Perhaps in retrospect, it should be no surprise that the theory caught on in 
popularity and came to describe roughly anyone and everyone—men, women, children, 
and the elderly—who subsists below the poverty line in certain problem areas. As 
mentioned above, even the famous author and Appalachian activist Caudill, whose 
firsthand experience of poverty in his own Kentucky homeland would seem to preclude 
him from being a proponent of the culture of poverty theory, used rhetoric that was 
closely in line with that of Oscar Lewis and others. These others included the government 
officials who threw their weight behind the legitimacy of the framework and, according 
to Ronald D. Eller in Uneven Ground, incorporated its principles into the inner workings 
of the War on Poverty. Eller says,  
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Later generations of scholars would reject the culture of poverty model as 
blaming the victim, but the theory played a powerful role in shaping many of the 
antipoverty programs of the late twentieth century. […] Lewis, [Michael] 
Harrington, and other leading advocates of the culture of poverty participated in 
the Shriver planning meetings to design the War on Poverty, and almost every 
program administered by the OEO [Office of Economic Opportunity] reflected 
the theory (101).  
This theory was so popular, especially among the government officials and experts who 
helped implement the War on Poverty, precisely because it promised easy solutions in 
what now seems an overly idealistic, if not impossible, endeavor: ending poverty in the 
wealthiest nation in the world. As Eller says, “the culture of poverty model” was just 
another example of the powerful elites “blaming the victims” (101).  
 It is not too difficult to see how the culture of poverty paradigm quickly grew in 
popularity. The theory had powerful and influential backers. It is also not difficult to 
imagine how the focus of the theory easily transferred from the subjects of Oscar Lewis’s 
case studies (poor Hispanics) to other impoverished communities in the American 
landscape, including African-Americans living in the ghetto and Appalachians living in 
mountain hollers. Even Caudill, the activist discussed above who was very sympathetic to 
the plight of the mountaineers, describes Appalachians in increasingly hopeless terms in 
Night Comes to the Cumberlands. As mentioned previously, there are times when he 
speaks of the amorality of the mountaineers (286). And in the quote below, he portrays 
mountaineers as unable to comprehend the capitalistic culture that has sprung up around 
them. His rhetoric, however, differs from the culture of poverty theorists’ because he 
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assigns at least some measure of blame to outside influencers rather than simply labeling 
the poor themselves as the main problem. Describing Appalachia in the 1920s, Caudill 
says,  
In the inrush of new cultures, ideas, prejudices and ambitions, the mountaineer 
was bowled over and swept aside. Eventually, as we shall see, he lost his 
confidence in his own mores and moorings. That he never found new social 
foundations to which he might securely attach himself we shall also see, and the 
demoralization and helplessness which flowed from that failure (106).  
But here Caudill’s language differs from the culture of poverty rhetoric that sought to 
blame the victim. Caudill acknowledges the victimhood of the poor, calling them 
demoralized and helpless, but he also points out that what truly led to the oppression of 
the poor in the mountains was “the inrush of new cultures, ideas, prejudices and 
ambitions” that left the hardscrabble mountaineer out of the equation of how to end 
poverty (106). Caudill’s observations were therefore at least somewhat more nuanced 
than those of people who viewed the poor from a strict culture of poverty framework. 
Still, speaking of “mores and moorings,” “amoral females,” and “the demoralization” of 
the poor, Caudill’s rhetoric borders on perpetrating the “poor are sinners” metaphor, 
which is a linguistic move allowed under the culture of poverty framework.  
 If, as Eller and others have said, the culture of poverty theory was largely 
discredited as a victim-blaming framework, then future generations ought to mind the 
lessons of the past. However, many people have speculated about the return of a culture 
of poverty framework as a convenient way to explain why the poor live the way they do, 
and perhaps no scholar brings as much weight to the discussion as Thomas Piketty in his 
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recent tome on Western economics, Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Piketty talks of 
the perceived morality of wealth and the immorality of poverty. He acknowledges a 
belief system in Western societies such as the U.S. that claims that the losers deserve to 
lose because they do not work as hard as those in society who are successful (433 – 7). 
He speaks of a meritocratic extremism in wealthy societies and asserts that myths are 
invoked to justify wage discrepancies (416 – 418, 422). Beneficiaries of welfare 
payments, he says, “are seen as wanting to live their lives on the dole,” which is 
reminiscent of the language from the culture of poverty days. Piketty notes, however, that 
the costs associated with the welfare state are very low compared to other forms of 
government spending (478 – 479). He delves deeply into popular topics, such as the 
much-maligned 1%, asking if the wealthiest in America have co-opted the democratic 
system. He argues that “‘the risk of the drift toward oligarchy is real’” in this country 
(514).  
 Whether or not the culture of poverty theory will indeed make a comeback and 
bring back into national prominence the underdeveloped metaphors that supported it, it 
nevertheless remains an important concept to study because of how widespread and 
accepted a theoretical concept it was in its day. It illustrates just how seductive anti-poor 
metaphors can be, including the idea that a poor person’s culture is like a web that has 
entangled him in his own poverty. As has been shown, the metaphors at the center of the 
culture of poverty create a circular logic and then compound themselves: poverty breeds 
criminality (or immorality and sinfulness), which then creates more poverty; the same is 
true of the relationship between poverty and dependency, as well as between poverty and 
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brokenness. The metaphors can be quite vivid and imagistic, though upon closer 
inspection, they are flawed.  
 Indeed, a closer inspection eventually helped delegitimize the culture of poverty 
theory. In a New York Times article from October 2010, Patricia Cohen reminds her 
readers that a high-level bureaucrat in the Johnson Administration named Moynihan was 
responsible for popularizing the culture of poverty theory in the upper echelons of the 
federal government. He described “the urban black American family as caught in an 
inescapable ‘tangle of pathology’ of unmarried mothers and welfare dependency.” 
Eventually, however, people began to see this way of thinking “as attributing self-
perpetuating moral deficiencies to black people, as if blaming them for their own 
misfortune” (Cohen). As Kiffmeyer states in Reformers to Radicals, the same moral 
deficiencies were seen in poor Appalachians, which shows just how seductive the culture 
of poverty theory—and anti-poor metaphors in particular—can be. It quickly spread all 
the way from the cities to the mountains where these anti-poor metaphors took root and 
grew.  
 Ultimately, it may be hard to believe that such an underdeveloped conception of 
reality as the culture of poverty could have had such widespread appeal and acceptance, 
and yet it did, from the elites to the everyday citizenry. Despite Oscar Lewis’ intentions, 
the culture of poverty theory came to define all people who lived in chronic poverty. 
Because the theory was a central component of the War on Poverty, it guided bureaucrats 
and poverty warriors alike in defining their conceptions of the poor. It rarely asked them 
to question their own assumptions. This is the truly nefarious power of language in 
general and metaphors in particular: they can cast the debate in starkly simplistic terms, 
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convincing large groups of people that the oppressed are responsible for their own 
oppression. As stated above, this sort of victim blaming allows the oppressors the option 
of not changing their habits because the habits of the oppressed are so deeply engrained 
in them. They are, from this underdeveloped conception, permanent belief systems. But, 
as has also been noted, Bourdieu argues that these belief systems, on both sides, can be 
changed, and this is why heretical discourse is such an important concept.  
Moving Toward Heretical Discourse to Challenge the Culture of Poverty  
 As the next chapter will argue, heretical discourse can be useful in challenging 
anti-poor perceptions similar to the ones that were legitimized and institutionalized by the 
culture of poverty theory. Acts of heretical discourse, when enacted by organizations that 
specialize in social justice, can help break the repetitive cycle of habits that reinforce 
these negative beliefs. Despite its problems, the 1960s, ironically a time when the culture 
of poverty theory was thriving, can offer an example of what effective dissent might look 
like. In the latter part of that decade, democratic participation was everywhere in 
America, and it took many different forms, which leads to an important question: If 
heretical discourse could somehow be institutionalized today, what would it look like? It 
could take any number of forms. It might be similar to what the Highlander Research and 
Education Center and other Appalachian community organizers have done for 
generations: finding problems and giving people in the community the linguistic tools to 
fix them. Or institutionalized heretical discourse might resemble what the so-called poor 
people’s movements were doing in the 1960s when they demanded more generous and 
transparent governmental aid. The poor people’s movement was one attempt by those on 
welfare, housing subsidies, and other assistance to gain greater visibility and argue for a 
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higher living standard. “Although the War on Poverty had been sold as an alternative to 
welfare,” says Frank Stricker in Why America Lost the War on Poverty—And How to Win 
It, “welfare rights activism was a model of what some planners wanted from community 
action, namely, poor people’s organization to make local social services more accessible” 
(119). By speaking up and demanding greater accessibility to and transparency from 
government leaders and agencies, the poor were proving that they were capable of having 
intelligent opinions and deserved equal treatment under the law, such as the freedom to 
dissent without fear of having their assistance cut. According to Stricker, this movement 
would have flourished at around the same time even without the War on Poverty 
pumping federal funds into agitation and community organization efforts.  
 That’s because the collective mood of the nation to help the poor inspired a new 
and legitimate devotion to help all Americans aspire to greater economic stability, even if 
it was, in retrospect, less than effective. “In the 1960s,” Stricker says, “new political 
possibilities opened as the civil rights movement shook people’s minds about equality 
and democracy. Millions were in motion against racism and poverty, sexism and war. 
Although the different movements were sometimes at odds with one another, their 
combined weight supported new initiatives in social policy” (84). As others have pointed 
out, Stricker argues that the culture of poverty theory was detrimental to the goal of 
eradicating poverty, but he makes another interesting argument that has important 
implications for this project. He says victim blaming was rampant in the 1960s not just 
because of the prevalence of the culture of poverty theory, but also because of the idea 
that people simply lacked the skills (or human capital) necessary to thrive. He says,  
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Human capital and culture-of-poverty assumptions meshed with popular attitudes. 
When the culture of poverty had a racial twist, as in Moynihan’s The Negro 
Family, it seemed to confirm whites in the belief that poverty was a result of bad 
black behavior. The human capital argument meshed with the faith that public 
education was a road to success. Both theories put much of the responsibility for 
poverty on the poor, although government would supply education and training. 
Both approaches emphasized fixing the poor rather than fixing economic 
structures (91 – 2).  
This is the same argument, explored above, that is made by the International 
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. The cultures of poverty and dependency are linked 
together and shape governmental policymakers’ perceptions of the poor as they craft the 
very programs aimed at alleviating poverty (Gale). To “fix” the poor, America simply 
had to teach them how to stop being poor.  
 By the time the War on Poverty was faltering, discussions among progressively 
minded economists and scholars (whom Stricker calls “the Dissenters”) seeking to revise 
public perceptions of the poor might have done some good in restructuring the way the 
War was waged (92 – 3). But politicians’ rhetoric, when combined with the tension 
linked to demonstrations in some of the major U.S. cities, had already so divided the 
nation that by the time Richard Nixon came into office, the whole idea of having an 
antipoverty war seemed pointless, even dangerous due to recent rioting in American 
cities. The War was scrapped instead of revised and its various departments dissolved or 
dispersed, though some of these renamed departments still exist today. The heated 
conversation of what role, if any, government should play in lifting people out of poverty 
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is also still ongoing, as is the struggle of two extremes, one seeking to define the poor as 
living in a culture of poverty, the other seeing society at large as the main generator of 
social oppression. Indeed, rhetoric of the poor as lazy or as deserving of their poverty 
should be familiar in today’s political landscape, and, according to Bourdieu, it is also 
self-perpetuating. This project has suggested that the culture of poverty theory is coming 
back into vogue, but then again, perhaps it never left. After all, the anti-poor rhetoric in 
chapter two of this project is strikingly similar to that seen in the 1960s, during the days 
when the federal government was attempting an unprecedented expansion of assistance to 
the needy. As the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences puts it, “Among 
scholars, sociologists in the field, and government policy makers, the debate as to 
whether poverty stems from social, political, and economic conditions or from 
entrenched behaviors on the part of the poor themselves, continues” (Gale).  
 As noted above, some good did come out of 1960s America’s attempts to wrestle 
with the huge issue of poverty. Even though the poverty warriors who came to 
economically depressed areas (such as Appalachia) arrived with ideas about the poor that 
conformed to the national dialogue, their ideas would be challenged and, in some cases, 
changed. Surprisingly, these changes of perception did not take much time at all. This 
observation further points to the power and efficacy of encouraging people from differing 
socioeconomic backgrounds to interact and to help one another, especially if there is a 
long-term commitment to such efforts. As Stricker notes, because of the civil rights 
movement, poor people of all colors were beginning to question their economic status in 
the United States. “But, as it turned out, federally funded organizations were involved in 
agitation and information efforts; neighborhood service centers raised people’s 
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consciousness about their rights. Hundreds of Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA) 
workers were organizers for welfare rights groups” (119). Similarly, in Uneven Ground, 
Eller shows that face-to-face interactions with the poor, especially when those 
interactions are aimed at alleviating poverty, can change the perceptions of the middle 
class. Here Eller argues that while the Appalachian Volunteers did often have 
shortsighted goals and an underdeveloped understanding of the causes of poverty in the 
region, those who stayed longer began to better see the flaws of the policies and 
procedures that were guiding their efforts. Eller says,  
Among the first assumptions to dissolve in the wake of field experience for many 
volunteers was the belief that poverty resulted from inherent deficiencies in 
mountain culture. Whereas weekend recruits could more easily accept cultural 
and geographic explanations for economic conditions in the region, volunteers 
who lived and worked in mountain communities for any period of time had more 
difficulty attributing poverty to the values, culture, and isolation of a people they 
came to admire. Occasional volunteers could “pop in, pop off, and pop out,” as 
local residents put it, but field-workers with their feet in communities understood 
the complexity of local circumstances and the political consequences of 
powerlessness. AVs and VISTA volunteers who lived in coal camps and other 
rural communities quickly rejected the culture of poverty theory and behavior 
adjustment strategies and searched for other explanations for poor housing, 
inadequate health care, deficient education, and joblessness among their 
neighbors. As they listened to local residents express “bitterness about their life 
experience, about the political structure and their relationship with the coal 
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companies and other big industries,” the volunteers adjusted their perception of 
powerlessness. “I felt like I was radicalized or politicized or whatever by the 
people who lived in the mountains themselves,” remembered one AV. 
Increasingly they came to understand the mountain experience in new ways, and 
they responded to alternative voices that defined the region’s poverty less as the 
product of Appalachian culture than of economic and political self-interest (135).  
When face-to-face interactions such as these challenge the unconscious beliefs of the 
dominant people in society, there is some hope that even misconceptions that are 
stubbornly institutionalized can be overturned. The culture of poverty theory, in other 
words, despite its stubborn resemblance to the truth, is nevertheless not a permanent 
conception of reality. It does, however, require that people of differing socioeconomic 
backgrounds interact with one another so that some deeper understanding of life 
circumstances can be crafted. This is why heretical discourse is so important and why, in 
the next chapter, organizational methods will be explored to suggest ways of pairing 
people from differing socioeconomic strata so that anti-poor perceptions can be more 




CHAPTER IV: HERETICAL DISCOURSE AND POVERTY  
Harnessing Heretical Discourse to Question Stereotypes in Appalachia  
 Bourdieu observes that one’s assumptions come largely from language and are 
reinforced by the daily habits that reproduce belief. Looking to Bourdieu and metaphor 
theory, this project has shown that many of the prominent stereotypes that define the poor 
are strengthened by certain ungenerous metaphors. If poverty is reinforced in part by 
language, what hope do those who are on government assistance have for questioning 
their oppression—and possibly even interrupting the cycle that keeps them oppressed? In 
the two quotes that closed out the previous chapter, Stricker and Eller confirm Bourdieu’s 
observations, saying that the cultural warriors who were in Appalachia (and other areas) 
for an extended period of time began to question their assumptions about the poor. 
Therefore, by being in close contact with community members who are impoverished, the 
middle class of today will not only be able to question their language choices regarding 
the poor, but will be much more likely to do so than if their interactions with the poor 
were kept to a minimum. In small but significant steps, they may ultimately be able to 
work toward overcoming these anti-poor metaphors that undergird their assumptions. 
This is both the importance of heretical discourse and what it predicts. It necessarily 
fosters discussion among groups of people who see themselves as different from one 
another. This discussion brings into view the perceived differences between the two 
groups and allows for a critique of how those perceptions were formed and so might be 
reconstructed.  
 Thus, with heretical discourse, Bourdieu offers a strong praxis for breaking from 
the accepted and dominant logic of a society’s perceived reality, which is why this 
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theory, when put into practice, can push back against the negative stereotypes that are 
supported by the anti-poor metaphors people unconsciously use to view the world. This is 
because heretical discourse specifically aims to call into question how the dominators in 
society have created cultural attitudes and social norms (i.e. habits) that invalidate the 
experiences of the poor. Heretical breaks can be very useful in “liberating” those people 
who find themselves dominated by habits of authorized language. “We know,” says 
Bourdieu in Language and Symbolic Power, “that the social order owes some measure of 
its permanence to the fact that it imposes schemes of classification which, being adjusted 
to objective classifications, produce a form of recognition of this order, the kind implied 
by the misrecognition of the arbitrariness of its foundations” (127). In other words, the 
social order that exists today has mechanisms that trick people into thinking it is 
permanent and invincible. But with heretical breaks, one can at least begin to shake these 
permanent structures. The dominant members of society might, for instance, think of the 
oppressed as unwilling to speak up because they do not know how to and do not wish to. 
Even if they did speak up, they would not know what to say to challenge their oppression. 
The act of shaking these perceptions, which are essentially silent power structures, might 
allow society’s dominant members to see that the oppressed, too, are people. According 
to Bourdieu, heretical discourse needs to call into question the unconsciously accepted 
beliefs held by these dominant members of society, and then it must give the oppressed 
the respect they deserve. He calls this “the legitimacy conferred by public expression and 
collective recognition” (129). For this reason, if the poor were offered the chance to 
participate in acts of heretical discourse, their attempts at speaking up could bring them 
face to face with the more affluent in society and force a reconsideration of society’s 
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dominant belief systems. As discussed throughout this project, these are the same belief 
systems that question the legitimacy of the welfare recipient in a democratic republic. As 
the last chapter showed, sometimes these belief systems can become so tacit that they 
become institutionalized and, as with the culture of poverty theory that guided the War on 
Poverty, can lead to the implementation of ineffective antipoverty policies.  
 One way of spreading heretical discourse would be to encourage the very 
government offices that administer welfare programs to redefine “work.” These offices 
could do much to publicize the alternatives available to able-bodied SNAP recipients who 
have no children, the so-called ABAWD population who must either go to work or lose 
their assistance. The definition of “work” is a fairly flexible one here. On a question-and-
answer webpage dedicated to ABAWD policy, the USDA says that it allows states to 
make the decision themselves as to whether they will accept volunteerism as a valid form 
of work: “Q. To qualify as ‘work,’ does the job have to be paying minimum wage or 
meet certain criteria? Can self-employment count as ‘work’? Can volunteer work count 
as ‘work’? / A. We will either address this in the regulations or allow State flexibility in 
this area. In the interim, State agencies may use their best judgment” (USDA). This 
flexibility has remained in place now that ABAWD is going back into effect, and most 
states appear to accept volunteerism instead of work, when necessary. The Tennessee 
Department of Human Services’ Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) 
Policy Manual, for instance, lists the following forms of work as valid ways for an able-
bodied SNAP recipient to fulfill his or her work requirements and continue qualifying for 
SNAP benefits: “Individual working 80 hours per month (20 hours a week average 
monthly). / This can be paid, volunteer, or in-kind” (Tennessee Department of Human 
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Services). If SNAP recipients began volunteering with organizations that specialized in 
heretical discourse, there is no reason to suspect that they would not be satisfying their 
work requirements.  
 One may pause here to voice a very real concern, namely that this type of 
volunteerism might provoke a negative reaction from state legislatures. Elected leaders 
might eventually ban heretical discourse aimed at overcoming negative perceptions of the 
poor as a valid form of “work” under the ABAWD rules. Because questioning one’s 
language choices can lead to public situations where multiple parties (the poor and the 
middle class, for instance) are encouraged to reconsider their deeply held beliefs, this 
may, in turn, stoke instances of political dissent. Indeed, if state legislatures decided to 
defund parts of the SNAP program or strip dissenters of their benefits, there would be 
precedent for such a move. In recent years, for instance, the Tennessee General Assembly 
attempted to restrict certain rights of protestors during the Occupy Nashville rallies. 
Beginning in late 2011, the furor of Occupy Wall Street spread from Manhattan across 
the country, and in Nashville, protestors set up semi-permanent camps at the War 
Memorial Plaza next to the State Capitol. In response, state legislators passed a law 
banning protestors from camping on certain state-owned properties, and authorities then 
arrested the protestors “who refused to leave” (Barrouquere). Tennessee officials were 
sued for violating the First Amendment rights of the protestors, but the officials 
eventually won on appeal (Rau). There is a possibility, therefore, that the General 
Assembly would react similarly if SNAP recipients began to protest for more rights or for 




 However, at the same time, if a state legislature attempted to ban acts of heretical 
discourse as a valid form of “work” for SNAP recipients, such a move would be further 
validation of this project’s thesis: that there is a deeply held belief in the minds of many 
in the middle class (and their representatives) that the poor should not be allowed to 
move around as freely, to speak as freely, to live as freely as those who do not need 
government assistance to survive. In other words, these benefits, which are written into 
law as owed to anyone who meets the income and technical eligibility requirements, 
become a sort of stamp of dehumanization in a democratic society. If a family is on food 
stamps, then there is something wrong with them. Additional laws need to be passed to 
make sure that they are not enjoying as many rights as everyone else is. For instance, if a 
poor person receiving benefits chooses to speak up against his or her government, hoping 
to bring a perceived injustice to light, then this person should not be allowed to eat.  
 Still, the potential threat of anti-poor legislation is not a reason to suspend an 
experiment that attempts to change people’s perceptions of the poor, and the SNAP 
program offers a good way of conducting that experiment. Because the ABAWD 
population of SNAP recipients can currently take part in different volunteer opportunities 
in order to continue qualifying for assistance, local welfare offices could encourage 
instances of heretical discourse in an effort to bring the middle class toward a closer 
understanding and acceptance of the perspectives of the poor. Such acts of heretical 
discourse could be broadly defined, but would ideally have the recipients of government 
assistance working closely with and speaking to community organizations whose 
members have explicitly stated an intention to further social justice causes. Most 
communities in the United States ought to have such organizations, but again, such 
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organizations do not necessarily have to pass a litmus test to be considered social justice 
campaigners. Even a newspaper could be considered a qualifying organization if it were 
willing to work with poor members of the community who wanted to publish editorials 
explaining their perspectives on the world. A SNAP recipient might expand on how she 
is, indeed, an equal member of the community who deserves to be treated with respect 
and dignity. She might tell an emotive story about the unfair treatment she has 
experienced in the community simply because she has had to resort to using government 
assistance. An example identical to this one, written as an editorial by Kathryn James and 
published by The Washington Post, was already given in the second chapter of this 
project. Indeed, the written—and spoken—word can be a form of heretical discourse.  
Satire as Heretical Discourse  
 Members of different socioeconomic strata who study and discuss the literary arts 
and popular media might also succeed in enacting heretical discourse. That’s because 
literary works and media, though they might perpetuate perceptions, also have a long and 
rich history as methods of challenging society’s dominant assumptions. Satire in 
particular does a great job of pushing people to question how they have arrived at their 
beliefs. Jonathan Swift’s A Modest Proposal, which encourages the poor to sell off their 
children as food, is a fantastic example of how a writer’s unexpected rhetorical choices 
can shock readers so deeply that they may suddenly uncover just how inaccurate their 
deeply held beliefs are (such as blaming the poor for their own poverty). Stephen 
Colbert’s analysis of “The Poors” on his show The Colbert Report has a way of 
disrupting Middle America’s perceptions of the poor as a homogeneous group, which 
was also what proponents of the culture of poverty theory assumed. Some still make this 
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assumption today, and, as discussed in chapter two of this project, Thomas Lucente says, 
“Your typical ‘poor’ person lives in a normal dwelling that is larger than that of the 
average non-poor European. Nearly 40 percent of the poor own their own homes. Poor 
children have the same protein and nutrient intakes as upper middle-class children” 
(Lucente). When Stephen Colbert twists the phrase “The Poor” and turns those who are 
struggling socioeconomically into “The Poors,” he disrupts the notion that all poor people 
are alike. Such an assumption is a problem because, if all the poor are indeed alike, then 
ensuring that their basic necessities will be met will do them no good. Poverty comes 
from a lack of personal responsibility, according to some, and a minimum wage will not 
change the poor if they have come to accept their poverty as permanent. “Minimum is a 
misnomer,” says Colbert. “$7.25? I can think of wages a lot lower: $3.28, $1.19, a pat on 
the back and a handful of mints—there are literally dozens of other things you could give 
them. A barn owl” (Colbert).  
 As always, Colbert’s hilarious satire is inspired by serious issues from the real 
world. He provides a blurb from a Wichita Eagle article quoting Charles Koch, the 
billionaire libertarian who “wants to eliminate the minimum wage because it creates a 
culture of dependency and keeps people with limited capital from starting their own 
business.” Colbert mocks this argument, sarcastically quipping that paying their 
employees will, indeed, keep small businesses from pocketing the money that would 
otherwise remain theirs. “I mean, look at our nation’s forefathers,” says Colbert. “Many 
of them arrived with nothing more than the blouse on their back, but thanks to no 
minimum wage, they started a booming cotton industry.” Here a photograph overtakes 
the screen. It is of African-Americans carrying cotton, ostensibly depicting a scene of 
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American slavery, a reminder to viewers that certain laws have been passed in an effort to 
roll back institutionalized injustice. Thus, the comedian-satirist enters into a difficult 
debate about how much a nation devoted to social justice should raise the minimum wage 
for the working poor, if at all: “I say the problem isn’t that the minimum wage is too low; 
it’s that ‘The Poors’ out there don’t know how to handle their cash” (Colbert).  
 With this satire, Colbert is attempting to point out how the beliefs of some of his 
peers in the media so often miss the mark. Bill O’Reilly, for instance, classifies the poor 
as a homogenous group, much like the culture of poverty theory did in the 1960s. The 
poor are, according to O’Reilly, likely to act as one unit, as an unthinking force 
habituated to further their own poverty, and a minimum wage will not help them. “Many 
of the poor,” says O’Reilly in a clip featured on Colbert’s segment, “will use the money 
irresponsibly.” O’Reilly then explains that poverty is the result of people’s lack of 
responsibility, a familiar sentiment. Colbert concludes in sarcastic agreement, using 
O’Reilly’s own circular logic against him: “If I were poor, I wouldn’t be, because I 
would turn being poor into an ‘op-poor-tunity.’” Colbert then looks into a public relations 
snafu that McDonald’s had found itself embroiled in. In 2013, the corporation had 
attempted to sidestep the issue of income inequality by asking that its employees, many 
of them considered members of “the working poor,” change themselves so that they 
could overcome poverty on their own, a familiar move that blames the victims for their 
oppression. A website for McDonald’s low-wage employees ironically attempted to teach 
them how to spend their money wisely. One video tells them to keep track of their daily 
expenses so they can observe the frivolous purchases they have been making: “Try it for 
one week to see if you notice a difference in your spending. Then try it for at least a 
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month to see that you really will spend less.” Colbert responds: “Then try a year. Then try 
a decade. Then fifty years. Then ask yourself, ‘Why am I still working at McDonald’s? 
I’m eighty-six years old.’” Again, he is disrupting the popular idea that poverty is the 
fault of the poor person, an assumption that some may not think to challenge without the 
satire pointing it out for them.  
Literature as Heretical Discourse  
 One contribution that literature offers society is the chance to see the world from 
others’ perspectives. Storming Heaven allows for such a discussion on how the poor in a 
given community are victims of societal structures that perpetuate their poverty. This 
novel is about the coal wars during the early twentieth century and the struggle to fight 
back and unionize in response to large, faceless corporations where absentee landowners 
seek to strip the environment of its resources and antagonistic businesspeople care only 
about the bottom line. The book is based in part on history, and so it could raise 
interesting questions regarding poverty as an ongoing narrative. Though it is a book set 
between 1920 and 1921, there are parallels with anti-poverty battles occurring in later 
decades. One such battle blends fiction with history, combining the imaginary world with 
the real one, as good literature does so well. The battle was waged inside the hotel room 
of a fictional coal unionizer named Rondal Lloyd, and it was also waged in the hotel 
room of Myles Horton, a social justice campaigner who fought for income equality and 
civil rights in real life.  
 There is a scene in Storming Heaven in which Rondal Lloyd tells mercenary gun 
thugs who have come to kill him that he is such a great organizer, he bets he can organize 
even them. They scoff at him and tell him they are already organized; they have 
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organized to kill him. What happens next is taken, almost word for word, from Horton’s 
autobiography, leading one to conclude that Rondal Lloyd is, in fact, based in part on 
Horton himself. As four company men prepare to barge into Horton’s hotel room to kill 
him, the self-proclaimed radical and democratic socialist never loses his humor:  
“Well, I’d like to talk to you a minute,” I said. “You know I like to organize.” / 
“Yeah, but your organizing days are over.” / “Well, the last thing I’d like to do is 
to try to help somebody get organized.” They laughed, and I said, “You know you 
guys need to get organized.” / “Why do we need to get organized?” one of them 
asked. / “Well, somebody’s going to come in this door,” I said. “You’re going to 
get the key down at the desk.” The hotel was owned by the company. “You’re 
going to come up here and one guy’s going to open that door and come in. And,” 
I said, “I’m going to kill the first person that comes in. Next, another person is 
going to come in and I’ll probably kill that person. When the third person comes 
in, it’ll be a toss-up whether I kill him or he kills me. And the last person, he’ll be 
able to kill me. There’s no question about that. You’ve got to decide which ones 
of you I’ll kill. I don’t have a problem—I’m going to be killed—but you’ve got to 
decide which ones of you are going to be killed” (Horton 124).  
Instead of “getting organized,” the gun thugs decide to leave. This slick wit and quick 
thinking on Horton’s part no doubt saved his life, as it does Rondal’s in Storming 
Heaven. Again, Rondal’s story is almost identical to Horton’s, with a notable and 
humorous exception that Rondal’s tormenters are not gun thugs but monsters, or “booger 
men” (238 – 40). This story was originally the intellectual property of Horton. It was an 
adventure that actually happened to him in 1937, but he evidently let Giardina use it in 
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her 1987 book about the coal battles of the early 1920s. Horton then published the story 
in his autobiography in 1997, which is essentially a reflection of his life advocating for 
equal rights, from coalfields to civil rights campaigns. And so literature can be adapted 
and shared as a method of telling stories to explore difficult intergenerational themes, 
such as poverty, violence, corruption, corporatization, and unionization.  
 This chapter in The Long Haul is entitled “Charisma,” and Horton discusses the 
danger of charisma while examining the importance of leadership. He begins the chapter 
with the following anecdote:  
Back during the heydey of the civil rights movement in Mississippi, I met an 
older black woman who told me, “We’ve got a Citizenship School down here.” I 
asked her what that was and she told me, “Well, you know, I go out and teach 
people to read so they can vote. I can read a little myself. . . .” And I said, “That’s 
great, where did you get the idea?” She told me, “I figured it out, and then I taught 
three other women to do it.” She had no idea that anybody else was doing the 
same thing. She’d probably been to a conference where somebody was talking 
about Citizenship Schools and the idea was so simple, she could pick it up and 
make it her own (113 - 4).  
It is appropriate that he begins the chapter with this little story because it shows how 
important sharing good ideas can be, as well as allowing people to take those ideas and 
make them their own to spread as they wish. It is what Horton allowed Giardina to do in 
her book. Sharing ideas to further discourse may indeed be the heart of democratic 
engagement, even if the capitalistic impulse is for each individual to claim his or her 
share of the intellectual property in question.  
74 
 
 An additional and important point to note is that, despite being structurally 
identical, Horton’s story has language that is markedly different from Giardina’s 
retelling. Much of this has to do with the relatively respectable language—including 
correct grammar—that Horton uses. One might call the dialect of Giardina’s characters 
more realistic. Horton says, “Then I told them, ‘That’s why you need to get organized. 
You’ve got to vote on who’s going to die’” (125). Giardina’s character Rondal says, “‘So 
you got to git together. You got to git organized. You got to decide which booger men 
will be the first ones through that door, because them will be dead booger men’” (239). 
These short excerpts are about as close as the language matches up in the otherwise 
identical stories. And so, when Giardina puts this story in the mouth of Rondal Lloyd, it 
is adapted as a more “folksy” telling. Thus, heretical discourse in the form of literature 
can show people who do not speak a dominant (or an “authorized”) dialect that they, too, 
can assume leadership roles. They can also make intelligent statements and rhetorical 
choices that question acts of corruption or even violence in their community. The poor in 
a given region may be reduced to certain stereotypes, but with their forceful words and 
their demands for recognition, even people whose ways of speaking may be considered 
“folksy” or “urban” can say something of value. Thus, both satire and fiction can be 
effective in enacting heretical discourse. Such works can disrupt stubborn stereotypes by 
showing how undeveloped they are and also by demonstrating that the poor are indeed 
capable of speaking up.  
Organizations That Might Enact Heretical Discourse  
 Then there are also traditional organizations that specialize in enacting heretical 
discourse that the recipients of government assistance could tap in order to continue 
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qualifying. Just as in the previous chapter, Appalachia can be a good case study in this 
regard, and Horton’s own Appalachian organization (Highlander) provides a good 
example of what some organizations might do in seeking to treat all people equally, no 
matter their language backgrounds. Indeed, because the region has long struggled with a 
multiplicity of problems (not just poverty, but also unfair labor practices, racism, sexism, 
religious intolerance, etc.), it has also had reactionary actors rise up at unexpected and 
much-needed times to provide inspiration and leadership to downtrodden populations. In 
this way, various pockets of Appalachia, for having had such a long history of 
socioeconomic oppression, could be microcosms of what communities hoping to enact 
heretical discourse could look like. For that reason, this chapter will focus on one specific 
group that has changed—and is continuing to change—the political and socioeconomic 
landscape of the region. To be sure, there are many more examples that could be given. 
The purpose of this relatively short analysis is twofold. First, it will show that such 
organizations can indeed effect change even in a region where oppression has become 
institutionalized. Second, it will expand on Bourdieu’s theory of heretical discourse and 
provide realistic ways that such dissent, which can be so important in the case of the poor 
in general and the SNAP recipient in particular, could be possible in one actual region of 
the United States.  
The Highlander Research and Education Center  
 There are many groups in the United States that specialize in enacting dissent. 
Groups such as the Highlander Research and Education Center, a stalwart organization 
that has fought for social justice causes for decades in Appalachia, can have an immense 
impact on helping the poor rise out of poverty, especially if these groups can successfully 
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teach the poor how to speak up—and to speak up forcefully without fear of reprisal—
which, if they do so while working with middle earners, will show the more affluent how 
aligned their goals, aspirations, and necessities are. To summarize, working together to 
dissent politically can teach new skills; ideally, however, and even more importantly, it 
can build bridges and new understandings between communities and economic echelons. 
It can, in other words, challenge the metaphors that have come to characterize the poor.  
 Connecting people for democratic change is one of Highlander’s goals, and as 
Eller points out, connecting people can have an immense impact on how they perceive 
one another. Highlander still specializes in this sort of socioeconomic and political 
transcendence, guided by its devotion to equality. A job announcement from 2012 
describes the organization’s central role in seeking change in oppressed areas:  
Fundamentally, Highlander is an intersectional resource for the U.S. South, a 
place where leaders, networks, and movement strands come together to interact, 
build relationships, craft joint strategy and develop tools and mechanisms to 
advance a multi-racial, intergenerational movement for justice in our region. 
Cornerstones of the work: building the skills of grassroots people and capacity of 
organizations for long haul work, and connecting people and issues for holistic 
analysis and broad-based movement building (“Highlander Research and 
Education Center: Position Available,” emphasis added).  
If society undertakes the massive task of helping the poor lift themselves out of poverty 
by offering them the chance to keep their government assistance in exchange for working 
with organizations that will then teach them how to democratically engage their society, 
their government, etc., there are, as in the days of the War on Poverty, plenty of 
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organizational templates to use in such an effort. Highlander offers one such template. 
Allowing the poor to remain on governmental subsistence assistance after their allotted 
time has elapsed will hopefully give the poor an incentive to learn the art of dissent, if 
guided by the right organizations.  
 Above all, by working with specific organizations, the poor will not only be doing 
good in their communities, but will also be interacting face to face with the middle class, 
who, in their discussions with the poor, will continue to see them in more and more 
humane terms. Heretical discourse is not necessarily the act of explicitly saying, “I am 
not that thing which you assume I am.” It can be much subtler than that. It might be a 
poor person, encouraged by the community, to stand up for something that he or she 
believes in. The act of taking a stand or of talking back with a firm voice would call into 
question the larger community’s underdeveloped views of the poor as hopeless and 
helpless. These acts of dissent, as Eller might note, can have real and lasting impacts on 
the community because they will encourage the middle class to see the poor as equal 
members of society. Also, it will force the realization that no change can be made, no 
matter how forcefully people stand up and talk back, unless a majority of voters vote to 
alter the socioeconomic structures of their communities.  
A History of Highlander  
 This project features Highlander for a couple of reasons. Mainly, the purpose is to 
give an example of just one type of organization (which at least partially focuses on the 
importance of languages choices in furthering social justice) that the aid recipient might 
select in order to keep qualifying for his or her benefits. Secondly, Highlander has a rich 
and vibrant history and a proven track record in enacting change in the Southeast, and it 
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has existed since the early 1930s. Jeff Biggers discusses that history, as well as the 
various forms of engagement the organization has undertaken, in his book, The United 
States of Appalachia: How Southern Mountaineers Brought Independence, Culture, and 
Enlightenment to America. Highlander was the brainchild of two progressive activists, 
Myles Horton and Don West, and the idea for Highlander came to them from what were 
called “the Danish folk schools,” which were local level experiments in democratic 
participation.  
 According to Biggers, these schools were quite popular and successful in 
Denmark. “Recognizing that a majority of the rural peasant population had lost touch 
with their own cultural traditions, language, and, ultimately, their role in the civic duties 
of society, the residential folk schools emerged as a place for adults to improve their 
literacy skills and learn about modern agricultural contributions and possibilities in 
Danish society” (174). Sometimes, the biggest contributions schools such as these can 
make to society may actually seem small at first, but they can in fact be revolutionary in 
the long term. For instance, in the days of U.S. segregation, when reading and citizenship 
tests were required before African-Americans could register to vote, a value could not be 
placed on teaching literacy. Such a small goal—teaching people their ABCs—can have 
huge ramifications when realized at the right place and the right time. The goal of these 
community schools was to give power back to the people, and, as Biggers points out,  
In an attempt to bring the displaced peasants into the inner workings of the 
liberated country, the curriculum stressed the wisdom of common people and 
land-based agricultural societies and cooperatives, education through life 
experiences, and learning through informed and lively discussions. Within a 
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generation, Denmark had witnessed a remarkable revival, thanks in many respects 
to the schools (174).  
Horton and West hoped to replicate the successes of these schools in places like 
Appalachia and elsewhere in the South where huge problems like racism were stubbornly 
systemic.  
 But why was Highlander different from other organizations that sought to help lift 
the rural mountaineer out of poverty? First of all, it was more realistic than utopian. 
“Both men [Horton and West] interpreted the ‘folk’ definition in its strictest sense of 
representing the aspirations of common people in dealing with their daily challenges, not 
in maintaining a quaint and apolitical, folkloric tapestry in the mountains” (175). Yes, the 
leaders of this Appalachian folk school did initially have trouble translating their ideas 
into practical change for the same reason that most revolutionary ideas do not always 
have smooth transitions from theory to praxis: “Untold utopian educational experiments 
in Appalachia, the South, and the rest of the nation, of course, had gone the route of 
burning enthusiasm into the dismal ashes of a disillusioning reality in a short time. In 
fact, Highlander did flounder in its first years before gaining a foothold in the region” 
(176). But eventually, the idea caught on. Much of the enthusiasm surrounding 
Highlander, not to mention the successes it had, had to do with the way it treated the rural 
poor as equals—and this is in direct contrast to how many of the government’s so-called 
poverty warriors saw the rural poor in the early days of the War on Poverty, which began 
a few decades later in the mid-1960s. Still, parallels can be drawn between the failed 
initiatives of the War on Poverty and some of the folk schools in the region other than 
Highlander. “Contrary to the outside missionary viewpoint of ‘saving’ the mountain 
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communities, as if they were deficient, Highlander stood out as a unique institution that 
recognized the ability of mountaineers to determine their own fate in volatile times,” says 
Biggers (177). Everybody, no matter what race, sex, or income status, was welcomed at 
Highlander, which was itself a revolutionary idea in America at the time. “Highlander’s 
fame circulated throughout the South as the singular mountaintop school where both 
whites and blacks could meet, in defiance of a 1901 Tennessee law forbidding interracial 
gatherings in the state. A black professor even taught occasionally at Highlander in the 
1930s” (178 – 9). Highlander was indeed central in the fight for civil rights, including 
school desegregation efforts. If today’s poor people on government assistance were 
offered the opportunity to pursue heretical discourse in exchange for an ABAWD waiver, 
the practices of an organization such as Highlander could offer good templates for what 
that heretical discourse might look like. Highlander has stood the test of time because its 
methods for teaching critical thinking have been effective. It has trained students, many 
of them poor, to recognize their own value in society, and (just as importantly) it has 
forced mainstream America to recognize that value as well.  
 One of the most famous “students” to attend Highlander was Rosa Parks. 
“Highlander’s interracial residential experience astounded Parks. […] Horton’s role in 
the workshop was crucial. Parks found the Highlander director to be the ‘first white man’ 
she could trust” (182 – 3). They became close friends, and she always remembered him 
fondly. “Speaking at a gathering thirty-five years after their meeting, she recalled 
Horton’s ability to ‘strip the white segregationists of their hardcore attitudes and how he 
could confuse them, and I found myself laughing when I hadn’t been able to laugh in a 
long time” (183). Horton was both a famously down-to-earth figure and a realistic teacher 
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in his goals. He sought ways of bringing practical changes to communities, which can be 
a realistic way of challenging the habitus. By making incremental changes, giving the 
oppressed person a little more access in society than he previously had, the social justice 
organization can slowly help bring about a change in the attitudes of the wider society 
that question the oppressed person’s worth. A down-to-earth leader may appear to be 
folksy or even ineffective, but in fact, by modeling what leadership looks like, he can 
help teach people how to be leaders themselves. Another important step that a social 
justice leader must take is encouraging oppressed people to put the lessons they have 
learned into practice, which again means that he is stepping away from the role of 
leadership and asking them to fulfill that role. Biggers says,  
Horton, who would always downplay any influence or role he held in the civil 
rights movement, concluded the workshop as he had done at all workshops with a 
session called “Finding Your Way Back Home.” He urged all the participants to 
picture how they might utilize the workshop discussions in their own 
communities. “You have brought these problems here,” he told them. “We have 
been a sort of catalyst in a process that makes a little bulge in your education. 
Now, are you going to keep on learning? Highlander will continue to relate to you 
in terms of this process when you get back. So you are not going back alone. We 
will work with you if you get in trouble” (183).  
Horton was a born speaker, and as an integrationist in a time when local, state, and 
federal powers conspired to keep the status quo (or, as Rosa Parks called it, “the status 
Crow”) the way it was, he knew the power of educating the common people. Even after 
losing court battles that resulted in the shuttering of his school, he was not dismayed. 
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“After nearly three decades of social crusades in the South and Appalachia, an amused 
but weary Horton dismissed the trial and school closing as a circus. ‘A school is an idea,’ 
he declared. ‘And you can’t padlock an idea’” (183, 193 – 4). As Biggers points out, the 
school still exists today (194). Indeed, it might be one of the schools that the poor in 
Appalachia come to, if they are given the chance to keep their government aid by 
volunteering their time to learn the art of dissent. There are plenty of other examples, but 
Highlander is an organization with a respectable history in East Tennessee and beyond. 
The school, located on tranquil farmland with beautiful views of the Great Smoky 
Mountains, still pursues social justice initiatives on a range of issues, including striving 
for gay rights, easing racial tensions, lobbying for inmates, and working with immigrants.  
How Is Highlander Forging Language Justice Today?  
 Indeed, Highlander remains at the forefront of some of today’s greatest social 
justice campaigns. Perhaps most relevantly to this project, it continues to see the 
importance that language plays in the dehumanization process of oppressed people 
throughout the United States, especially regarding immigrants who are not fluent in 
English. Due to issues of racism and xenophobia, immigrants are already at a 
disadvantage when coming to this country, and these disadvantages are compounded if 
they are unable to speak the dominant language of the land. According to the Pew 
Research Center, the poverty of recently arrived immigrants to the U.S. grew from 18% 
in 1970 to 28% in 2013. The trend has not been nearly as stark for U.S.-born Americans; 
in 1970, poverty among this population was at 14%, and in 2013, it had risen to 15% 
(“Poverty of Recently Arrived Immigrants Has Grown”). Thus, Highlander’s focus on 
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making sure immigrants have the tools to communicate with their communities is 
warranted.  
 In an online article in EverydayFeminism.com, writer Alex-Quan Pham explores 
the difficulty that many immigrants encounter when they come to this country and are 
unable to speak English. Pham says,  
A life without language, without the ability to name things, to address people, to 
describe how you’re feeling, to ask for what you need, is a horror that I can barely 
imagine. […] When immigrants come to “America,” they are routinely stripped of 
their language. They are expected to learn English immediately and flawlessly, 
because the kind of people that Americans consider respectable talk and look like 
middle-class white people. / We are told that there is one correct form of English, 
and deviating from grammar and pronunciation rules associates us with the 
working class. Not only is this classist, but it fortifies the idea that English has a 
“proper” form — even though every variation of English has been constructed.  
Here Pham is echoing Bourdieu’s observations that the linguistic habits of some people 
conform more closely to the authorized form of a given language. Those who do not 
speak “properly,” in other words, are often considered outside of society’s mainstream. 
And if a person cannot speak the language at all, then his or her hopes for advancement 
are practically nonexistent.  
 Highlander promotes the movement known as “language justice,” which can be 
defined as providing reasonable accommodations to people who are not fluent in English 




Language is at the core of people and their cultures and is the vehicle for t [sic] 
people to share their ideas, strengths and dreams for a better world. In order to 
build broader movements for justice, it is important to create multilingual spaces 
where language is used democratically and as a tool of empowerment, so that 
people can communicate, learn and strategize together (“Language Justice”).  
By assuring them that their words will be understood, workshops devoted to language 
justice allow immigrants to participate in Highlander’s social justice campaigns. These 
workshops could also be a great way for multiple segments of an impoverished 
community—for instance, both those who were born in the U.S. and can speak English 
and those who were born outside the country and are not fluent in the language—to 
connect with the larger community, including those in the middle class who are fluent 
English speakers. Pham, who took one of Highlander’s “Interpreting for Social Justice” 
workshops, agrees that language justice is essential to social justice campaigns, saying, 
“Some of us shamed our parents for not speaking English as well as we did, for not 
assimilating as well as we did. The internalized oppression that comes from language 
injustice leads us to harm one another. / And that’s why healing is a crucial part of 
language justice.” When Pham speaks of healing, this is in reference to the ways one can 
overcome America’s devastation of numerous nations, including Vietnam. Healing can 
also occur within communities divided by socioeconomic strata, and that concept of 
“healing” is essentially what this project promotes when it asks for middle income 
Americans to interact with the poor so that they might challenge the anti-poor stereotypes 
that they have come to accept as true.  
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 If SNAP recipients work with immigrants to further their social justice campaigns 
and are thus allowed to continue qualifying for these benefits, this would add another 
level of complexity to the way language shapes perceptions of antipoverty assistance. A 
poor person born in the U.S. would continue to receive his or her assistance, while many 
of the immigrants would not be able to qualify at all because they would likely not be 
citizens. Nevertheless, these two populations, by working together, might overcome some 
of the preconceived notions that each has of the other. Meanwhile, the middle class 
would get to work with both populations and would, ideally, also have their perceptions 
challenged.  
 According to its website, Highlander offers multiple workshops for language 
justice, but one of them is entitled “What Did They Say? Interpreting for Social Justice: 
An Introductory Curriculum.” In a 2009 manual that explains the curriculum of “What 
Did They Say?” Roberto Tijerina asks, “What do oppressed people have in common with 
each other?” There are multiple answers to this question, but four of them are: “We lack 
social and economic equality / We are all stereotyped, demonized, and dehumanized […] 
/ We blame ourselves… / …And society blames us.” Toward the end of this manual, one 
of its central goals is listed, and it is also the central goal of this project: “to struggle 
together through our own stereotypes (whatever they might be!) and our own 
domination” (Tijerina).  
 With an emphasis on how language molds people’s perceptions, the questions that 
this research has aimed to answer are simple enough: What hope do people living in 
Appalachia and the surrounding areas (or in any community in America) have for a better 
life when they have lived in extreme poverty for generations? To whom can they turn 
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when the wider society’s language structures militate against them? And what methods 
do these groups to whom they turn hope to use to encourage the growth of social justice? 
With the advocacy of enough groups such as the Highlander Research and Education 
Center, one might yet see a bright future for these communities. Sometimes, a volunteer 
opportunity that seeks to overturn stereotypes can be just as encouraging as the promise 
of a good-paying job, especially if the volunteerism is a grassroots effort that passionately 
seeks to challenge people’s perceptions. While jobs and economic development are of 
course very important to the people living in Appalachia, residents who receive SNAP 
benefits may also grow to understand the importance of leadership development and 
higher education.  
 Future research into East Tennessee and the surrounding region would find many 
more groups that mobilize people for real and lasting social change. One of them is the 
Coal Creek Watershed Foundation, an organization focusing on local history, 
environmentalism, and education in the largely rural Anderson County, Tennessee (Coal 
Creek; Matheny; Moore). Another interesting group is the South Knoxville Alliance, 
which hosts Knoxville SOUP, a program combining small-scale democracy with charity 
to award micro-grants to worthy individuals and groups hoping to better the community 
(“Knoxville SOUP”). For those looking to build a larger list of social justice 
organizations, a book edited by Stephen L. Fisher entitled Fighting Back in Appalachia: 
Traditions of Resistance and Change is a good place to start. This is a compilation of 
sixteen essays by various Appalachian contributors (including the conclusion written by 
Fisher himself, plus his introduction). The book is an eclectic collection that paints a 
picture of regional domination and insubordination, focusing on groups such as Save Our 
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Cumberland Mountains (SOCM) and Kentuckians For The Commonwealth (KFTC). 
These groups—whether focusing on environmentalism, education, equality, etc.—have 
an important role to play in the future of the region, and hopefully they will continue to 
cultivate leaders ready for democratic engagement. As always, the region needs strong 
leaders willing to take on the faceless machines of corporations and government. They 
need leadership to represent the will of the people. Perhaps most important of all, a group 
dedicated to social justice needs to teach the poor the confidence and skills necessary to 
interact with the more affluent, so that the middle class can continue casting a more 






 The goal of this project has been to spotlight the negative rhetorical choices that 
people make when describing the poor and to point out how language can therefore be a 
systemic cause of the poverty that afflicts the very people those rhetorical choices 
critique. One major reason some metaphors are so dangerous, including those that 
compare the poor to animals, parasites, and sinful criminals, is because they allow the 
people who believe them to critique oppressed individuals without applying that same 
critical analysis to their own habits. They allow people to blame the oppressed, in other 
words, without much consideration going toward how that oppression is socially 
constructed. Metaphor is a slippery creature, often concealing more than revealing, and 
by dissecting our language choices, we may become more conscious of the ungenerous 
stereotypes that we use to understand the poor. That is the first step. A second step may 
be for the more affluent in society to join with the poor to enact heretical discourse 
together, not necessarily so that the poor can change the ill circumstances in which they 
live (though that is of course a possible outcome), but because the middle class might 
then grasp the fact that the poor are, indeed, people.  
 There are plenty of organizations out there that will give the poor and the more 
affluent the opportunity to work together toward this goal of re-humanization, and at the 
same time as they interact with one another, they might also work toward achieving 
various social changes, with an eye toward that ultimate goal: changing the 
socioeconomic landscape for those who are poor in the richest nation in the world. Some 
of these organizations that offer templates for heretical discourse are well established; 
others are new and still struggling to gain footholds in the communities they hope to 
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serve. Attempting to find a comprehensive list of all the organizations in the United 
States that could help communities fight for social justice could be as overwhelming as 
entering into the world’s largest Google search, and so this project has attempted to 
narrow the answer down a little, looking specifically at TV satire, literary fiction, and an 
Appalachian organization. This way, a few specific methods that might succeed in 
challenging people’s perceptions of the poor have been highlighted, though a 
comprehensive list of all possible methods could never be constructed in this short space. 
That is one reason why the same offices that administer government aid such as SNAP 
could join in the effort in locating various community organizations devoted to social 
justice. Trained social services workers could vet these social justice-minded groups and 
provide their clients with longer lists of area agencies that need volunteer help. At the 
same time, social services workers might also be encouraging their clients to seek 
opportunities in their communities that will allow for different definitions of “work,” 
including opportunities that emphasize education (such as discussing literary satire in 
reading groups or writing opinion pieces for publication in local newspapers) and 
leadership (such as working with immigrant populations to help them achieve English 
fluency or to protest their perceived oppression).  
 Some may argue that it is not possible to effect fundamental socioeconomic 
change in a society as large and diverse as the U.S. This goal, some may say, is especially 
not likely if one of the central methods is simply to encourage the more affluent to 
interact with impoverished members of the communities in the hope that such 
interactions will spur changes in perceptions. But to refute such an argument, one need 
only look back fifty years to an era embroiled in civil rights and a poverty war. Those 
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days were not perfect. They did not lead to total societal change, largely because people’s 
perceptions were supported by many of the same stereotypes they should have been 
working to overcome. And yet, looking back to those days, skeptics will find people who 
would, in some ways, look forward to our current society. By looking back to the days 
when the poor were supposedly to blame for their own poverty, skeptics will see parallels 
with today’s American society. They may also find people whose perceptions were 
changed because they did the hard work of critically analyzing some of the inconsistent 
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